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THE MISSING INSTRUMENT:  DIRTY INPUT LIMITS 
 
David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article evaluates an environmental protection instrument that the 
literature has hitherto largely overlooked, Dirty Input Limits (DILs), 
quantitative limits on the inputs that cause pollution.  DILs provide an 
alternative to cumbersome output-based emissions trading and 
performance standards.  DILs have played a role in some of the world’s 
most prominent environmental success stories.  They have also begun to 
influence climate change policy, because of the impossibility of 
imposing an output-based cap on transport emissions.  We evaluate 
DILs’ administrative advantages, efficiency, dynamic properties, and 
capacity to better integrate environmental protection efforts.  DILs, we 
show, not only have significant advantages that make them a good policy 
tool, they also help us to fruitfully reconceptualize environmental law 
in more holistic fashion.     
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THE MISSING INSTRUMENT:  DIRTY INPUT LIMITS 
David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden∗ 
 
 In recent debates about how best to design regulatory 
mechanisms to stem global warming, a new regulatory instrument has 
begun to emerge.  But we have yet to recognize it as such—to give it a 
name or appreciate its implications for environmental law.  Once we 
name and define this new instrument, we’ll see that in a certain sense, 
it’s not new at all.  Although the academic literature has largely 
overlooked it, it has for decades lain hidden in plain sight—playing a key 
role in some of environmental law’s most significant success stories.  
This article aims to shine a light on this previously unrecognized 
instrument:  to tell the story of its successes, evaluate its features, and 
discuss its future prospects.   
 After decades of experience in designing regulatory instruments 
to combat various forms of environmental degradation, the discussion 
still largely revolves around a single dimension of the problem: the 
choice between traditional regulation—often called “command-and-
control”—and market-based mechanisms, like pollution taxes and 
emissions trading.1   But designing regulatory instruments to address 
environmental ills presents another important choice as well:  the choice 
                                                 
∗ David M. Driesen is University Professor, Syracuse University 
College of Law (effective July 1, 2008).  Amy Sinden is Associate Professor, Temple 
University Beasley School of Law.  Thanks to Dean Hannah Arterian of the Syracuse 
University College of Law and Dean Robert J. Reinstein of Temple Law School for 
research support, the staff of the University of Michigan Law School Library, Myriah 
Jaworski, Janet Moon, Shannon Markley, and Poliana Irrizary for research assistance, 
and the participants in the University of Michigan Fawley Series, the Property 
Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurism workshop at Durham University and Jonathan 
Wiener for their comments.   
 1 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive 
Program:  Beyond the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 290-91 (1998) (explaining that scholars employ a 
“conventional dichotomy” contrasting “command and control regulation . . . with 
economic incentives”).  See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental 
Policies:  What Can We Learn from U.S. Experience (and Related Research), in 
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LESSONS FROM TWENTY 
YEARS EXPERIENCE 19 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, eds. 2007) (distinguishing 
market-based approaches from conventional approaches “frequently characterized as 
command-and-control approaches”); Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative 
Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND 
ENERGY ECONOMICS, Vol. I, 395 (Alan V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney, eds., 1985); 
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, & Robert Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 313-14  (1998); 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:  Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 Yale L. J. 677, 679 (1999); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, 
Comment Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).   
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2 
between outputs and inputs. Virtually all of our existing environmental 
regulation, whether traditional or market-based, focuses on polluting 
processes’ outputs.    Traditional regulation requires each pollution 
source to meet the output limit in its permit, while a trading regulation 
allows polluters to trade permits so that a polluter facing high control 
costs can pay a polluter with low control costs to make extra reductions 
in her stead.2  But both limit outputs.     
 Governments, however, can also reduce pollution by reducing 
inputs.  To reduce automobile air pollution, for example, we can either 
limit the output of exhaust coming out of the tailpipe or the input of gas 
going into the engine. While we’ve traditionally focused vehicle 
regulation primarily on the exhaust output, designing regulation to stem 
global warming poses challenges for that model.  Accordingly, some of 
those designing climate change regulation have begun to shift away from 
the usual focus on outputs.  A number of proposals for climate change 
regulation, including the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act 
currently pending in Congress, address the transportation sector by 
imposing a quantitative cap on the carbon content of fossil fuels 
refineries and importers introduce into the economy.3  This represents a 
fundamental shift in focus from outputs to inputs. 
Although it has yet to be recognized as such, a quantitative cap 
on the carbon content of fossil fuels is an example of a distinct and 
underused type of regulatory instrument with far-reaching implications 
both within the climate change context and beyond.  We call this new 
instrument “Dirty Input Limits” (DILs).  DILs are regulatory limits on 
the inputs that constitute the root causes of pollution.  They can take the 
form of traditional performance standards, requiring each producer or 
importer of a dirty input to keep production levels within the limits in its 
permit, or they can be made tradable, allowing a firm to produce more 
than the limit allows if it pays another firm to produce less than the limit.  
We argue below that DILs offer an important alternative to output-
focused regulation, and that policy makers should consider this 
alternative in tackling serious environmental problems requiring 
fundamental change.  Because they have the capacity to simultaneously 
reduce multiple sources of environmental degradation along a production 
stream and to spur fundamental technological innovation, DILs offer 
significant advantages over existing regulation in many contexts. They 
also have the capacity to spark a reconceptualization of environmental 
law, away from the fragmented, pollutant-by-pollutant approach that 
now dominates the field. 
                                                 
 2 See Driesen, supra note 1, at 290; J. H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY 
AND PRICES 92-100 (1968).  
 3 See infra, notes 65 to 74 and accompanying text (describing 
Lieberman-Warner bill).  
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 Part one introduces DILs.  Part two analyzes DILs’ advantages 
and disadvantages.  Part three articulates some conclusions about DILs’ 
potential role in improving environmental law, using the example of a 
DIL limiting oil use.  Used to limit fossil fuels, DILs offer a streamlined 
and effective regulatory tool for addressing global climate change, while 
simultaneously achieving a host of other important policy goals as well.  
 
 
I.  DILs:  An Introduction 
 
 This part begins by distinguishing between two fundamentally 
different means that polluters can employ to reduce pollution outputs:  
“End-of-the-pipe controls” reduce pollution at the end of the production 
process while “pollution prevention” reduces pollution by reducing or 
eliminating inputs.  We then go on to show that even though policy-
makers and scholars have consistently stated a preference for pollution 
prevention, environmental law generally regulates pollution outputs, 
rather than the inputs that create pollution.  We then describe how Dirty 
Input Limits offer an alternative regulatory instrument that limits inputs.   
Finally, we tell the story of how DILs, while not recognized as a distinct 
regulatory instrument, have already produced some of our most 
conspicuous environmental success stories.   
 
A.  Inputs, Outputs, and Production Streams 
 
 Production usually creates two outputs, a desired product or 
service and an unsought byproduct, pollution.  Driving a car, for 
example, produces a desirable output, mobility, but also creates air 
pollution outputs as byproducts.  And a coal-fired power plant releases 
air pollution as an output through its smokestack as a byproduct of the 
production of a desirable output, electricity.    
 A production process creates these outputs by using and often 
transforming inputs—the gasoline that makes a car’s engine run or the 
coal a power plant burns, for example.  The character and quantity of 
pollution outputs depends heavily upon the nature and quantity of these 
inputs.  The use of unleaded gasoline eliminates lead pollution from a 
car’s exhaust, and the use of low-sulfur coal reduces sulfur dioxide from 
a power plant’s emissions.  Moreover, a single input usually produces 
several different pollution outputs, often in several media.  For example, 
a pulp and paper plant using chlorine as an input produces a variety of 
water and air pollution outputs.4   
                                                 
4  See Environmental Protection Agency, Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, 
Paper, and Paperboard Category; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
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 Polluters can reduce or eliminate pollution outputs in two 
fundamentally different ways:   
 
1) End-of-the-pipe controls:  Under this method the 
polluter does not change its inputs or production 
processes.  Thus, it does not reduce the amount of 
pollution initially created.  Instead, the polluter adds 
on some device—like a catalytic converter, a 
smokestack scrubber, or a carbon sequestration 
process—at the end of the production process to 
reduce the amount of pollution actually released into 
the environment.    
 
2) Pollution Prevention:  Alternatively, polluters can 
reduce or change inputs in order to reduce or 
eliminate the initial creation of pollution.  Changing 
or reducing inputs may require moderate or radical 
changes to the production process itself.  An electric 
utility, for example, might reduce sulfur dioxide 
emissions from its coal plant by substituting low 
sulfur coal inputs for high sulfur coal.  Alternatively, 
it might eliminate pollution outputs altogether through 
a radical alteration of the electricity production 
process—replacing the coal-fired power plant with a 
field of wind turbines.   
 
 Both academics and policymakers have long favored pollution 
prevention over end-of-the-pipe controls.5  For one thing, the literature 
recognizes that end-of-the-pipe controls sometimes achieve pollution 
reductions in one medium, in part, by transferring the pollution problem 
to another medium.  Pollution controls that municipal waste combustors 
use to limit air pollution, for example, often produce a toxic fly ash that 
can present solid waste disposal problems.6   
                                                                                                                       
Pollutants for Source Category; Pulp and Paper Production, 58 Fed. Reg. 66078, 
66,092, 66,101-02 (Dec. 17, 1993) (describing toxic pollutants discharged into air and 
water from pulp and paper mills resulting from chlorine use). 
5  See, e.g., Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention, 
and Environmental Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1 (1997) (cataloging pollution 
prevention’s advantages); NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, BRIDGE TO 
A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 4, 8 
(1995) (praising shift in environmental policy from end-of-the-pipe technology to 
pollution “avoidance”). 
 6 See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 
330 (1994).  
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Additionally, end-of-the-pipe controls focus on one type of 
output into a single medium at a time.  Hence, effectively controlling all 
relevant pollution outputs using end-of-the-pipe controls often requires 
the installation of multiple end-of-the-pipe controls for different types of 
pollution.  This can involve a lot of expense and spawn fragmented 
decision-making.   
By contrast, pollution prevention can eliminate many different 
types of pollution in several different media simultaneously.7  For 
example, diminishing the amount of gasoline input a vehicle uses 
reduces hazardous air pollutants associated with cancer,8 pollutants 
associated with smog,9 carbon dioxide causing global warming,10 and oil 
runoff causing water pollution.11  Furthermore, pollution prevention 
often saves operators money either in absolute terms or relative to the 
costs of end-of-the-pipe controls.12  Thus, the conventional account 
favors pollution prevention—the reduction or elimination of dirty inputs.  
Indeed, Congress implicitly endorsed this account in 1990 when it 
passed the Pollution Prevention Act,13 which declared a national policy 
favoring pollution prevention.14  
                                                 
 7 See Strasser, supra note 5, at 7, 45-46.  
8  See Joan Leary Matthews and Louise G. Roback, California Cruisin-
New York's Adoption of California's Vehicle Emissions Program, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. 
OUTLOOK 36, 36(1998) (pointing out that vehicle emissions account for over half the 
cancer risk from toxic pollution in New York urban areas); John Hiski Ridge,Comment: 
Deconstructing The Clean Air Act: Examining The Controversy Surrounding 
Massachusetts's Adoption Of The California Low Emission Vehicle Program, 22 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163, 167 (1994) (pointing out that mobile sources are the nation's 
largest source of cancer causing toxic emissions).  
9  See Matthews & Roback, supra note 9, at 36 (stating that automobiles 
account for over half of New York volatile organic compound and nitrogen oxide 
emissions). 
10  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The 
Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 515, 542 n. 94 (2004)  (quantifying the average annual per vehicle emmissions of 
carbon dioxide). 
11  See EPA, Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68722, 68725 
(December 8, 1999) (explaining that pollution runoff from vehicles is a significant 
source of water pollution). 
 12 See, e.g. Fully Halogenated Chloroflurocarbons, 42 Fed. Reg. 24542, 
24544 (1977) (predicting $58 to $240 million in consumer cost savings from switching 
from fully halogenated chlorofluroalkanes as aerosol propellants to other products).  
 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (2000).  
 14 In this statute, Congress found “significant opportunities” to “prevent 
pollution at the source through cost-effective changes in production, operation, and raw 
materials usage.”  42 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(2) (2000).  Accordingly, Congress declared a 
“national policy” that “pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source wherever 
feasible.  42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2000).  It declared pollution prevention preferable to 
recycling, end-of-the-pipe “treatment” and release of pollutants into the environment.  
Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 13102(5) (2000) (defining “source reduction”).    
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 This conventional account may have exaggerated pollution 
prevention’s benefits by suggesting that it always is cheap.15  As we 
explore further in Part II, pollution prevention can sometimes prove 
more expensive than end-of-the-pipe controls, at least vis-a-vis a single 
polluting output.16  But the conventional account has also tended to 
understate some of the most far reaching and important advantages of 
pollution prevention.  We highlight these under-appreciated advantages 
here. 
 Pollution prevention produces significant advantages over end-
of-the-pipe controls because it reduces multiple polluting outputs 
simultaneously.  This occurs not only because a single production 
process may produce more than one pollution output, but also because 
reducing an input may reduce a whole series of pollution outputs from 
multiple production processes all along a production stream.17  This 
feature of pollution prevention arises from inputs’ place in a production 
stream.  Inputs consist of either raw materials, such as coal, or 
manufactured products, such as gasoline.  Hence, a given input in one 
production process must either be the product of some previous 
production process (e.g. gasoline) or the result of extraction of a natural 
resource (e.g. coal).  This relationship among processes implies that 
reduction of dirty inputs also reduces the amount of a natural resource 
being extracted or the amount of a product being manufactured to create 
the input (or both).  Since the processes creating dirty inputs usually also 
generate pollution outputs, pollution prevention usually reduces 
pollution outputs in two or more different production processes 
simultaneously. 
 These relationships among processes imply that input reductions 
have a multiplier effect.  If, for example, we reduce the amount of 
gasoline going into every car, we will do more than simply reduce the 
amount of exhaust coming out of each tailpipe.  We will also reduce the  
                                                 
15  See Michele Ochsner, Pollution Prevention:  An Overview of 
Regulatory Incentives and Barriers, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 586, 590-91 (1998). 
16  See infra notes 134  to 145 and accompanying text. 
17  A fairly extensive literature on Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) looks at 
production streams in a similar way, attempting to describe (usually in quantitative 
terms) all of the resources used and pollution emitted throughout the life cycle of some 
product, from resource extraction, to manufacture, to product disposal.  See Anthony D. 
Owen, The Transition to Renewable Energy, in THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
259, 262-63 (Anthony D. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004); Margaret Walls & Karen 
Palmer, Upstream Pollution, Downstream Waste Disposal and the Design of 
Comprehensive Environmental Policies, RFF Discussion Paper 97-51-REV (Jan. 2000).  
See also Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented, Federal Eco-Information 
Policy, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1435 (1995) (arguing that cost and data limitations require LCA 
analysts to rely on numerous simplifying assumptions which make LCA highly 
manipulable in practice). 
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pollution and ecological disturbance caused by oil drilling,18 transporting 
oil (air pollution from loading oil tankers and potential for oil spills),19 
oil refining,20 and leaking storage tanks in gas stations.21   
 We can visualize the production of automobile mobility, for 
example, as a stream, beginning with the extraction of crude oil, ending 
with the burning of gasoline in a car’s engine to produce mobility, and 
producing a series of dirty outputs along the way: 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  The automobile mobility production stream 
 
 
A drilling process produces oil, which the producer ships to a refiner.  
Both the drilling process and the shipping process create pollution, but 
they also deliver a useful product, oil, which becomes the input for 
another process, oil refining.  The oil refiner takes oil as an input and 
creates more pollution, mostly hazardous organic compounds of various 
                                                 
18  See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY:  FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 361 
(2004) (describing the environmental harms associated with offshore oil drilling), 
available at:   
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/welcome.html#final
  
19  See Margriat F. Carswell, Balancing Energy and the Environment in 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF OIL 179, 182-85 (Richard J. Gilbert, ed. 1993) (describing 
impacts of oil transport on air, water and biological resources).  
20  See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Compliance Sector 
Notebook Project, Profile of the Petroleum Refining Industry, EPA/310-R-95-013, at 
42-57 (1995) (summarizing TRI data on pollution releases from oil refineries), 
available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/notebooks/pet
roleum.html 
 21 See Use of MTBE as a Fuel Additive to Gasoline, 65 Fed. Reg. 
16094, 16100-02 (2000) [hereinafter MTBE Proposed Ban] (explaining that a ban of 
MTBE might be necessary, because in spite of extensive regulation governments have 
not been able to prevent oil spills and gasoline leaks).    
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kinds, but also a product, gasoline.22  And then the gasoline becomes an 
input into a car, which produces yet more pollution, and a really useful 
output, mobility. 
A production stream involves a flow from an upstream extraction 
of a natural resource to a downstream end-use.  We will refer to 
processes closest to the natural resources extraction end of these 
production streams as “upstream” and those processes closest to 
consumption as “downstream.”  (See Figures 1 and 2.)   
Imposing end-of-the-pipe controls on the pollution produced by 
automobiles addresses only one of the many sets of dirty outputs 
associated with the oil/automobile mobility production stream.  
Reducing inputs at any point along the stream, on the other hand, 
constricts the flow through the entire stream and thereby reduces not 
only the dirty output associated with the particular production process at 
issue, but a whole series of dirty outputs all along the stream.23  Thus, 
limiting the amount of gasoline cars can use, for example, would not 
only limit car exhaust, but also reduce the dirty outputs from oil drilling, 
transport, and refining as well. 
Similarly, if we reduce (or eliminate) the coal going into each 
power plant, we do more than simply reduce the amount of air pollution 
coming out of power plant smoke stacks.  We reduce the number of coal 
miners killed or injured by mining, ecological devastation and water 
pollution caused by coal mining, and the pollution from processing and 
transporting coal.24    
The production stream associated with the coal input to coal-
fired power plants can be visualized as follows: 
 
                                                 
 22 See Andrew P. Moriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting 
Regulation:  Why Gasoline Costs so Much (And Why It’s Going to Cost More), 72 
BROOKLYN L. REV.  939, 957-62 (2007) (describing oil refining’s evolution).   
 23 See, e.g., Ozone-Depleting Chlorofluorocarbons:  Proposed 
Production Restriction, 45 Fed. Reg. 66726, 66730-31 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 CFC 
Proposal] (explaining that a production restriction would create price increases that 
would induce users to switch to other substances).  
 24 See Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 
15 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. J. 1,  24-37 (2007) (discussing coal’s impacts on human health and 
the environment); MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, COAL RIVER:  HOW A FEW BRAVE 
AMERICANS TOOK ON A POWERFUL COMPANY-AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT-TO 
SAVE THE LAND THEY LOVE (2008) (discussing mountaintop removal mining’s 
environmental impacts). 
Limited DILs may have limited multiplier effects.  A DIL limiting the use of 
high sulfur coal would reduce the impacts that mining high sulfur coal has on health 
and the environment.  But it would increase impacts from mining low sulfur coal, just 
as the acid rain program did.  A DIL limiting coal use altogether would have broader  
positive ripple effects on mining’s impact on health and the environment. 
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Figure 2:  The coal-fired power plant production stream 
 
 
Some of the assumptions used in economic modeling might 
suggest that end-of-the-pipe controls can have some of the same ripple 
effects that pollution prevention measures have up and down the 
production stream.  We might, for example, predict that requiring 
installation of catalytic converters in automobiles would raise the price 
of cars and therefore reduce the amount of driving.  If this end-of-the-
pipe control reduced driving, it would ultimately reduce oil and gasoline 
consumption just as a pollution prevention measure would.  But the 
mechanism by which pollution prevention creates ripple effects through 
the production stream is fundamentally different from the mechanism by 
which end-of-the-pipe controls might do so.  Pollution prevention’s 
ripple effects arise from physical flows, not unpredictable economic 
incentives.25   
Furthermore, for a number of reasons, end-of-the-pipe controls 
rarely produce the consumption changes that economists sometimes 
posit in modeling environmental policy instruments’ efficiency.  First of 
all, the increased cost of an end-of-the-pipe control may never reach the 
consumer.26  While producers certainly will want to pass the increased 
                                                 
 25 Cf. J. L. Lewin, Energy and Environmental Policy Options to 
Promote Coalbed Methane Recovery, Atomic Energy Commission USA—Reports 497, 
502-05 (Conference 950572) (1995) (doubting that coal mining firms will respond to 
pollution taxes as vigorously as economic models would predict); Margrethe Aune, 
Energy Comes Home, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5457 (2007) (arguing that home energy 
consumption does not conform to a rational economic actor model); Kevin Maréchal, 
The Economics of Climate Change and the Change of Climate in Economics, 35 
ENERGY POL’Y 5181, 5183 (2007) (overwhelming evidence shows that consumers 
neglect cost saving energy efficiency measures).   
 26 Cf. Anna-Lise Linden, Annika Carlsson-Kanyama, Bjorn Eriksson, 
Efficient and Inefficient Aspects of Residential Energy Behavior:  What are the Policy 
Instruments for Change, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1918, 1923 (2006) (noting that Swedish 
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cost associated with pollution control on to consumers, in highly 
competitive markets they may worry about lost sales and keep prices 
constant.27  Second, even if the cost reaches the consumer, the consumer 
may simply pay the cost rather than decrease consumption.28  For some 
consumers, driving is a practical necessity and they will find other ways 
of cutting costs if forced to absorb increased costs when buying a new 
car.  The large increase in vehicle miles traveled since the introduction 
of catalytic converters suggests that one should not assume that an 
absolute decrease in consumption will necessarily result from any given 
cost increase.29  End-of-the-pipe controls will only rarely produce the 
kinds of ripple effects that pollution prevention measures will reliably 
produce.               
 
B.  The Anatomy of Pollution Control Mechanisms 
 
 The vast majority of our mandatory environmental regulations 
focus on pollution outputs rather than production inputs.30  This is 
                                                                                                                       
apartment dwellers keep their dwellings hotter than homeowners, because the 
homeowners bear the incremental cost of additional energy use, but the apartment 
dwellers do not).  
 27 See, e.g., Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. 
11299, 11310 (1978) (predicting that cosmetic and chemical firms phasing out ozone 
depleting substances will not be able to pass on cost increases to consumers, because 
doing so will produce market share losses).  Economists use a property known as price 
elasticity to describe this possibility.  If producers can raise prices without losing sales, 
economists describe the price as elastic.  When the prices are elastic, economic models 
predict that producers will pass on cost increases to consumers.  When raising prices 
will reduce sales, economists describe the prices as inelastic.  Inelastic prices may force 
producers to refrain from passing cost increases on to consumers through raised prices.  
See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS -- (17th ed. 2001).       
 28 See generally DAVID B. GOLDSTEIN, SAVING ENERGY:  GROWING 
JOBS 154-172 (2007) (discussing reasons that markets often do not produce 
economically rational decisions).  
29  See Implementation of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the House Comm. on 
Commerce, 104th Cong. 7 (1995) (testimony of Barry Felrice, National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration) (vehicle miles traveled increased by over 60% between 
1975 and 1993). 
30  The Clean Air Act imposes limits on emissions from smokestacks, 42 
U.S.C. §7411 (2000) (new source performance standards), and tailpipes, 42 U.S.C. § 
7521(2000), and the Clean Water Act imposes limits on effluent from outfall pipes and 
other water pollution outputs, 33   U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).  Two exceptions to this 
focus on outputs are the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2601-92 (2000), which authorizes EPA to ban or limit the production of toxic 
substances, and The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments 
of 1972 (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000), which authorizes EPA to ban the sale 
of or limit use of pesticides.  Both of these statutes have produced remarkably little 
regulation by EPA however.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy 
Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343 (2002); Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal 
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perhaps understandable, since it is pollution outputs that proximately 
cause harm.  But to the extent the United States government has focused 
on inputs, it has usually done so through voluntary programs.31  For 
example, EPA has created a 33/50 program, where chemical companies 
volunteer to reduce priority toxic pollutants through pollution 
prevention, such as process changes that reduced the use of a priority 
toxic pollutant as a feedstock.32   
 The mandatory output-based regulation that currently dominates 
U.S. environmental law falls into four fundamental categories:  (1) Work 
practice standards dictate the use of specific technologies to control 
pollution outputs.33  Such a regulation might, for example, require the 
installation of catalytic converters in automobiles, or require the 
installation of scrubbers in coal-fired power plants.34  (2) Performance 
standards require a particular level of pollution reduction without 
directly dictating technological choices.35  A performance standard 
would require that emissions from a tail pipe or a smoke stack not 
exceed a particular limit, but give the car manufacturer or the power 
plant operator discretion as to how to meet that limit.  (3) Pollution taxes 
simply require the polluter to pay a set fee to the government for each 
                                                                                                                       
Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 
YALE J. L. REFORM 369 (1993). 
 31 See Ochsner, supra note 15, at 598-601; Robert F. Blomquist, 
Government’s Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the United States, 29 
GA. L. REV. 349 (1995).    
32  See Timothy T. Jones, Walter G. Wright, Jr. &  Mary Ellen Ternes, 
Environmental Compliance Audits: The Arkansas Experience, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock 
L. Rev. 191, 236 (1999). 
 33 See Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 444; see, e.g., Adamo 
Wrecking v. EPA, 434 U.S. 275, 287, 294-95 (1978) (discussing a work practice 
standard requiring wetting down of buildings during demolition to avoid asbestos 
emissions).  Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h)(3), 7412(h)(3) (2000) (authorizing EPA to 
approve adequately demonstrated substitutes for the compliance technique required by 
its regulations).  The provisions in the environmental statutes authorizing work practice 
standards allow for a wide variety of techniques, including pollution prevention.  See, 
e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1), and § 7412(h)(1) (2000).  But in practice, the agencies 
usually focus on output controls.    
 34  Cf. Driesen, supra note 1, at 298 & n. 50 (showing that pollution 
control law disfavors work practice standards).  In fact, the EPA regulations that 
encouraged installation of catalytic converters and scrubbers took the form of 
performance standards.  See id. at 300-301; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g) (1994).  These are 
stylized examples to make the point clear.   
 35 See Driesen, supra note 1, at 297-98; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. 
Stavins, Incentive-Based Regulation:  A New Era for an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 
5-6 (1991) (describing performance standards as identifying a “specific goal” without 
specifying the means the firm must use to meet the goal); Richard B. Stewart, 
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law:  A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. 
L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1981) (recognizing that performance standards allow firms to 
choose the cheapest method of achieving compliance).  
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unit of pollution she produces.36  (4) An emissions trading scheme 
establishes performance standards, but allows each polluter to exceed 
the limit set for its own facility if it pays somebody else to reduce in its 
stead.37  Under such a scheme, polluters with low pollution control costs 
have an incentive to reduce pollution levels and sell excess permits to 
producers with high pollution control costs.38  In this way, polluters 
deliver a given amount of aggregate pollution reduction at the lowest 
cost.39   
Scholars frequently frame debates about these regulatory 
mechanisms in terms of a conventional dichotomy between “command 
and control” regulation and “market-based mechanisms.”40  Writers 
                                                 
 36 See Stavins, supra note 2, at 21 (describing a pollution tax as 
assessing a charge on the amount of pollution that a firm or other source generates).  
 37 See Driesen, supra note 1, at 290 & n.2 (describing trading as 
allowing “polluters to avoid reductions at a regulated pollution source”, if they pay for 
or make “equivalent reductions elsewhere”); David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit 
Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Techology, 16 J. ENVT’L 
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 54 (1987).  
 38 See Stavins, supra note 1, at 22 (firms reducing their emission below 
allotted levels can sell “surplus permits” to other firms).  
 39 Id. (“tradable permits—can achieve the same cost-minimizing  
allocation of the control burden as a charge system.”)   
 40  In fact, this distinction is overdrawn.  See Driesen, supra note 1, at 
299.  Traditional command-and-control regulation also operates by way of economic 
incentives.  Regulated entities comply with government rules precisely because they 
have an economic incentive to do so in the form of fees or penalties that will be 
assessed for noncompliance.  Id. at 323.  Conversely, so-called economic incentive 
programs also depend on government command to a substantial degree—the command 
to pay a tax at a certain rate or to refrain from polluting without a permit.  See, e.g., id. 
at 324 (explaining that an emissions trading program relies on government commands 
limiting emissions); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a 
Private Property Solution, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 533 (2007) (criticizing the distinction 
and offering an alternative typology); Lesley C. Mcallister, Beyond Playing Banker:  
The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 274 
(2007) (describing agency decisions about emission caps as a “basic component” of 
trading).  Moreover, the common assertion that our current constellation of federal 
environmental statutes relies primarily on command-and-control regulation is 
overstated.  Most current regulation actually takes the form of performance standards, 
which do not “command” the use of any particular technology but rather simply specify 
a level of environmental performance that must be met to avoid penalties, leaving the 
method of compliance to the individual firm.  Driesen, supra note 2, at 297–98.  See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2000) (defining “standard of performance” as “a standard 
for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation 
achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which . . . 
the [EPA] determines has been adequately demonstrated.”).  See also PPG Indus., Inc. 
v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) (Standards of performance must be 
“established only in the form of emissions limitations based on output, and not in the 
form of work practice or operation requirements.”).  In some instances, where 
emissions are difficult to monitor, regulations impose work practice standard, which 
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often lump work practice and performance standards together under the 
pejorative term, “command-and-control regulation” (a term which 
sounds like a reference only to work practice standards) while they laud 
pollution taxes and emissions trading schemes as exemplars of a more 
modern and enlightened “market-based” approach.41    To avoid 
confusion and misleading pejorative terminology, we use the term 
“traditional regulation” to refer to both performance standards and work 
practice standards, rather than the term “command and control 
regulation.” 
As noted above, all of these regulatory mechanisms—whether 
traditional or market-based—focus on the reduction of pollution outputs 
rather than inputs.42  Nonetheless, with the exception of work practice 
standards, all of these mechanisms give polluters discretion to choose 
how to reduce those outputs.43  Accordingly, under a scheme of 
pollution taxes, emissions trading or performance standards, a producer 
can choose to achieve pollution output limits (or avoid pollution taxes) 
by limiting inputs through pollution prevention measures rather than 
installing end-of-the-pipe technologies.44  Under this approach the 
decision to choose pollution prevention over end-of-the-pipe controls is 
purely voluntary.  Polluters will presumably limit inputs when such an 
approach offers a cheaper option than end-of-the-pipe controls for 
meeting a pollutant-specific output limit or avoiding a pollutant-specific 
tax.  
                                                                                                                       
dictate the use of specific pollution control technologies, but such standards are the 
exception rather than the rule.  Driesen, supra note 2, at 299. 
 41 See, e.g. Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 313-14, Wiener, supra note 
1, 679; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1. 
 42 See  Gloria E. Helfland, Controlling Inputs to Control Pollution:  
When Will it Work?, 19 ASS’N OF ENVTL. & NAT. RES. ECONOMISTS 13 (November, 
1999) (the “theory of pollution taxes and permits has been developed primarily” in 
terms of emissions or damages, rather than inputs). 
 43 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 11 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en 
banc) (output regulation leaves “[t]he method for achieving the required result . . . 
entirely in the hands of the manufacturers”).  In fact, even work practice standards offer 
some flexibility, but this flexibility can be quite limited.  The provisions authorizing 
them direct EPA to accept alternative technologies that perform as well as the 
technology required by a work practice standard.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(3) 
(2000).  But since EPA employs these standards when measurement is not feasible, see 
e.g., id. § 7411(h)(1), such a demonstration may often prove difficult in practice.    
 Commentators usually associate emissions trading with pollution prevention, 
but this association is somewhat misleading since traditional performance standards and 
pollution taxes also can induce polluters to adopt pollution prevention as an alternative 
to end-of-the-pipe controls.  Moreover, experience has shown that emissions trading 
programs, like other output-based regulations, often spur end-of-the-pipe control.  See 
infra notes 143 to 145 and accompanying text. 
44  See Ochsner, supra note 15, at 596-98 (describing examples of 
pollution prevention initiatives undertaken by firms in response to incentives created by 
output-based regulation). 
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 C.  Locating the Missing Instrument 
 
 While the vast literature on regulatory instrument choice has 
generally focused on different ways of regulating outputs and paid little 
attention to the alternative of regulating inputs, some of the economic 
literature on pollution taxes has obliquely addressed this idea by focusing 
on the choice between upstream and downstream taxes.45  The 
distinction between upstream and downstream often correlates with the 
distinction between inputs and outputs, but it need not necessarily do so.  
A prime example of an upstream tax that arises frequently in the 
literature on climate change is the idea of levying carbon taxes “at the 
wellhead.”46  This would be a tax on inputs rather than outputs.  Indeed, 
since all goods ultimately rely upon inputs derived from natural 
resources, moving upstream far enough inevitably brings one to the 
question of inputs.  But a partial move upstream can also simply involve 
a move to an earlier pollution output along the production stream.  Thus, 
EPA has regulated both tailpipe emissions47 (downstream) and emissions 
from petroleum refineries48 (further upstream).  In any case, the tax 
literature usually does not explicitly distinguish taxation of inputs from 
taxation of outputs.49   
While the idea of using taxes to directly regulate inputs has 
received some attention, though oblique, in the academic literature, that 
                                                 
 45  The environmental tax literature identifies the administrative 
advantages of levying taxes upstream rather than downstream.  See Andrea Baranzini et 
al., A Future for Carbon Taxes, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 395, 406 (2000) (recognizing 
that “upstream” carbon taxation will reduce monitoring costs); Frank Muller and J. 
Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes: Carbon Taxes for Revenue and the 
Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 42 (1994) (noting that to simplify 
enforcement it is “commonly proposed” that a carbon tax be levied at the point where 
fossil fuels enter the economy, such as the wellhead, the mine mouth, or the dock).  The 
stream of production tends to begin with a narrow group of actors conducting a 
particular type of process.  But as we move upstream the variety of actors and processes 
can multiply, thus increasing administrative costs associated with administering a 
pollution tax.  Indeed, in practice carbon taxes are almost always imposed upstream, on 
the carbon content of fuels, rather than downstream on CO2 emissions.  See Fanny 
Missfeldt & Jochen Hauff, The Role of Economic Instruments, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 115, 135 (Anthony D. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004).  As we 
discuss in Part IIA, these advantages often apply to regulatory input limits (DILs) as 
well.   
46  See Muller & Hoerner, supra note 45, at 42. 
47  See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000). 
48  See 40 C.F.R. Part 60, subpart J. 
49  Cf. Arild Vatn, Input versus Emission Taxes:  Environmental Taxes in 
a Mass Balance and Transaction Costs Perspective, 74 LAND ECON. 514 (1998); Walls 
& Palmer, supra note 17, at 4, 10-11 (discussing possibility of taxing inputs rather than 
polluting outputs). 
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literature has generally ignored the idea of applying the other market 
mechanism—trading—to inputs rather than outputs.50  As we discuss in 
more detail in Section ID1, several recent papers have discussed the idea 
of a cap and trade program limiting the carbon content of fossil fuel 
inputs as a method for regulating carbon emissions. 51  But these papers 
conceptualize these measures as a form of output regulation and are 
narrowly focused on the context of climate change.52  They do not 
                                                 
 50 In their classic article on instrument choice, Bohm and Russell 
mention briefly in passing the possibility of regulating inputs rather than pollutant 
outputs when the inputs “are perfectly correlated with the volume of pollutants 
discharged and less costly for the government to monitor.”  See Bohm & Russell, supra 
note 1, at 443.  Clearly, they view the idea as simply a proxy for measuring pollution 
outputs that are difficult to monitor, rather than a fundamentally different approach to 
pollution control regulation.. 
 51 See Robert R. Nordhaus, New Wine in Old Bottles:  The Feasibility of 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 53, 57 
(2007) (mentioning the possibility of “an upstream cap-and-trade program” regulating 
“fuel producers, refiners, or transporters”); Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, 
Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 129-34 (2005);  Jason Shogren, Climate 
Protection:  What Insight can Economics Offer?, in THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 57, 64 (Anthony d. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004) (mentioning choice 
between upstream and downstream approach in designing carbon trading program); 
Edwin Woerdman, Organizing Emissions Trading:  The Barrier of Domestic Permit 
Allocation, 28 ENERGY POLICY 613 (2000) (discussing upstream and downstream 
approaches to designing international greenhouse gas trading program); Catherine 
Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe:  
Lessons from Economic Literature and International Experiences, 43 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 213, 215 (2002) (discussing upstream and downstream approaches to designing 
greenhouse gas trading programs); Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to 
Address Global Climate Change, 7 available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/projects/hamiltonproject/Research-Commentary.aspx (2007) 
(recommending imposition of an economy-wide cap on emissions “upstream” at the 
point where fossil fuels are extracted, processed, or distributed); Robert R. Nordhaus & 
Kyle W. Danish, Designing A Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program For The 
U.S. iii (2003) [hereinafter Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report] (describing an upstream 
cap and trade program as requiring fossil fuel suppliers to “surrender allowances 
equivalent to the carbon content of fossil fuels they distribute”), available at 
http://www.pewclimatecenter.org (last visited June 13, 2007); Congressional Budget 
Office, An Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing U.S. Carbon 
Emissions viii (2001) [hereinafter CBO Report] (discussing an “upstream program” 
under which fuel producers and importers would have to hold allowances “based on the 
carbon emissions that would be released when their fuel was combusted”), available at 
http://www.cbo.org (last visited June 13, 2007); Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP), 
U.S. Carbon Emissions Trading:  Description of an Upstream Approach  1 (1998) 
[hereinafter CCAP, Upstream Approach] (suggesting a DIL requiring fossil fuel 
producers to “hold allowances for the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in their 
fuels”), available at http://www.ccap.org (last visited June 13, 2007); see also Helfland, 
supra note 4251  (discussing input taxes and tradable permit systems in a brief article 
for a newsletter). 
52  See infra note 61. 
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recognize that input limits might be more generally conceptualized as a 
distinct regulatory instrument nor do they systematically explore the full 
potential of such an instrument.   
 Thus, a potentially significant regulatory instrument is missing 
from the discussion on regulatory instrument choice.  We call that 
missing instrument “Dirty Input Limits” or “DILs.”53  A DIL is a 
regulation that imposes a limit on the amount of an input allowed to be 
produced or consumed.  DILs can take several forms.  Regulators can 
limit the production of an input, or regulators can limit the amount of the 
input that manufacturers or consumers can use.  They can establish DILs 
by simply imposing an input limit for each producer or user of a targeted 
substance (performance standard DILs).  Or they can create tradable 
DILs.54 
 For example, a regulator could use a DIL to limit the amount of 
oil used in the economy by requiring producers and importers of crude 
oil to hold allowances.55  Once the regulator introduced such 
production (or consumption) allowances, she could make them tradable, 
thereby allowing one producer, the buyer, to extract more oil than the 
allowance permitted if the producer paid another producer, the seller, to 
extract less oil than the seller’s allowance permitted.  Thus, it is possible 
to create DILs in the form of either tradable or non-tradable quantitative 
restrictions on inputs.    
 
 D.  Examples of Dirty Input Limits 
 
 While DILs may lie hidden from scholars, they already exist in 
practice and, indeed, have a proven track record.  Congress currently has 
bills before it to make a DIL variant part of the United States strategy to 
                                                 
 53 The very term “emissions trading” may help explain the neglect of 
DILs in the realm of quantitative mechanisms.  This term focuses on pollution outputs 
and leading scholars have explained the mechanism in terms of trading limits on 
pollution outputs.  Yet, scholars sometimes employ broader terms like “tradable 
allowances” to refer to quantitative market-based mechanisms, in the place of narrower 
“emissions trading” term.  This broader terminology suggests awareness that trading 
programs in practice do not focus solely on emissions, a term that, strictly speaking, 
refers only to air pollution outputs.  We have, for example, trading programs for water 
pollution, wetlands, habitat conservation, and fishing.  See Sinden, supra note 40, at – 
(describing various types of trading programs). 
 54 See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730 (explaining how 
such an approach could apply to CFC production limits)  
 55 See, CBO Report, supra note 51,  at viii (“under an upstream 
program” fossil fuel producers and importers would hold allowances); CCAP Upstream 
Approach, supra note 5151, at 4  (suggesting a DIL requiring fossil fuel producers to 
hold allowances for the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in their fuels).   
Alternatively, a DIL could be imposed at some other point in the production stream, on 
refineries or even consumer of gasoline.  
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address global warming, and governments around the world have already 
used them to achieve some of humanity’s most celebrated successes in 
addressing environmental problems.  The two most prominent historical 
examples of the use of DILs will be familiar to every environmental law 
or policy professional:  the phase-out of chemicals depleting the 
stratospheric ozone layer and the elimination of lead from gasoline.  We 
discuss the climate change, ozone depletion, and lead applications below. 
  
  1. Climate Change 
 
As soon as policy makers began the work of designing regulatory 
instruments to cut greenhouse gas emissions, they recognized that the 
transportation sector posed particular problems.  From the outset, most 
proposals focused on cap-and-trade as the regulatory instrument of 
choice.56   And for the substantial portion of GHG emissions that come 
from electricity generation and large industrial plants, designing such a 
system is relatively straightforward.  Indeed, the most widely recognized 
and successful prototype—the acid rain trading program—itself involved 
emissions from power plants.57  Designing a similar system for carbon 
dioxide emissions only requires minor tweaking.  
 But tackling the substantial portion of GHG emissions that come 
out of the tailpipes of individual motor vehicles is far more 
complicated.58  Involving every vehicle owner in a trading program 
would be far too cumbersome to be practicable.59  Nor could one 
effectively cap emissions by focusing on auto-manufacturers, since total 
emissions is affected not only by factors like fuel efficiency that a car 
manufacturer can address but also by factors outside the manufacturer’s 
                                                 
 56 See Richard D. Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences with Domestic Climate 
Policies 1990-20012:  A Model for Future International Strategies? 2 (Climate Policy 
Center, March 2003) [hereinafter Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences] (“, , , the principle 
option for a mandatory policy to reduce U.S. carbon emissions is an emissions trading 
system.”), available at:  http://www.cpc-inc.org/assets/library/4_1morgenster.pdf.  A 
Sense of the Senate Resolution adopted as an amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 on June 22, 2005, stated that “[i]t is the sense of the Senate that Congress should 
enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, market-based 
limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases.”  See also Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, Report of Working Group III, 
7.3.5 (2001) (“Many advocates prefer emissions trading [as the instrument for climate 
change regulation]”), available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.htm. 
57  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000). 
 58 The same problems arise in designing a system to cover emissions 
from small industrial sources as well as home heating using natural gas and oil.   If a 
regulation leaves these sources out, then regulation of electricity producers might 
simply result in a shift from homeowners heating with electricity to heating w/oil or 
natural gas. 
 59 See Stavins, supra note 51, at 20 (finding a downstream cap and trade 
system infeasible, in part because of the need to regulate millions of vehicles).    
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control, like the number of miles driven or the type of fuel used.   
Because of this, existing cap-and-trade programs addressing climate 
change leave out transportation, and therefore fail to cap economy-wide 
emissions.60  
The impossibility of capping transport emissions through output 
controls, however, has pushed some policy makers to focus on inputs 
rather than outputs in designing climate change regulation.61  A number 
of policy analysts recommend an approach that would impose a cap on 
the carbon content of fossil fuel inputs rather than on CO2 emissions as 
they come out of the smoke stack or tail pipe.62  An input-based system 
                                                 
60  See, e.g., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/ 
[hereinafter RGGI MOU] (describing the Northeast region’s cap and trade system as 
limited to electric utilities);.Council Directive 2003/87, Annex I, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 
(listing sources regulated under the EU emissions trading scheme); B. Mortensen, The 
EU Emissions Trading Directive, 14 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 277 (2004) (same); 
Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007.  See generally  Note, The Compact Clause 
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1959-1960 
(2007) (describing the political process establishing RGGI); Rie Watanabe & Guy 
Robinson, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE CHANGE 10 
(2005) (describing the EU’s emissions trading scheme). 
61  Since there is no end-of-the-pipe technology available to limit carbon 
dioxide emissions from cars anyway, see Control of Emissions from New Highway 
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929 (Sept. 8, 2003) (“No technology 
currently exists or is under development that can capture and destroy or reduce 
emissions of CO2. . .”), an input-based approach to regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions from the transportation sector involves a relatively minor conceptual shift.  
Indeed, these proposals tend to still focus on outputs, treating limits on the carbon 
content of fossil fuels as a kind of proxy for limits on carbon dioxide emissions.  Thus, 
none of the literature discussing such DIL-like regulation on carbon inputs has noted or 
investigated the ancillary pollution control benefits that such an approach can provide 
with respect to the other pollution outputs on the fossil fuel production streams.  See 
sources cited at note 51. 
 62  See Stavins, supra note 51, at 19 (recognizing that an “upstream” 
trading approach “makes economy-wide coverage feasible.”); CCAP Upstream 
Approach, supra note 51; Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51; 
Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences, supra note 56, at 3 (“[T]he strong efficiency 
advantages of an upstream system suggest that if the United States is to achieve major 
reductions in carbon emissions, it will ultimately need to rely on such a system.”); 
Richard Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions and Limiting Costs (Resources for 
the Future, Feb., 2002), available at:  
http://rff.org/rff/Core/Research_Topics/Air/McCainLieberman/loader.cfm?url=/commo
nspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=4482; CBO Report, supra note 51; Raymond Kopp, 
Richard Morgenstern, William Pizer, & Michael Toman, A Proposal for Credible Early 
Action on Climate Change (Resources for the Future, Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Kopp, et 
al., A Proposal], available at:  
http://www.rff.org/rff/Publications/weathervane/Features/1999/A-Proposal-for-
Credible-Early-Action-in-US-Climate-Policy.cfm; Hidenori Niizawa, Tatsuyoshi Saijo 
& Akinobu Yasumoto, Proposal of Upstream Emissions Trading in Japan (OECD 
Global Forum on Sustainable Development, March, 2003), available at: 
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that imposed a permit requirement on all petroleum refineries, oil 
importers, natural gas pipelines and coal processors in the U.S. would 
involve fewer than 2,000 entities in the permit market. 63  That is similar 
to the number of facilities subject to the Clean Air Act’s acid rain trading 
program.64    
The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, which was voted 
out of committee to the Senate floor on December 5, 2007,65 adopts a 
hybrid approach, combining input-based and output-based systems.66  
The Climate Security Act would impose an overall cap on emissions 
from the electricity, industrial, commercial and transportation sectors of 
the economy.67  With respect to major coal-fired power plants and other 
industrial facilities, the program would work much like the successful 
acid rain trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act.68  EPA would 
require each such facility to monitor the greenhouse gases escaping from 
its smoke stacks and to hold a tradable allowance for each metric ton of 
CO2 (or its equivalent) it emitted into the atmosphere.69   On the other 
hand, the bill would addresses transportation sector emissions by 
imposing limits on the production of the fossil fuels that will ultimately 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/28/2957725.pdf; Sen. Pete V. Domenici & Sen. Jeff 
Bingaman, Design Elements of a Mandatory, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas 
Regulatory System 4 (Feb. 2006) (“It is hard to see how greenhouse gas emissions from 
the transportation sector could be addressed in a downstream permitting system.”), 
available at: 
http://members.4cleanair.org/rc_files/3243/Domenici&Bingamanwhitepaper2-2-06.pdf; 
Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches:  The Ideal 
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of 
the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship 
Act, 45 Nat. Resources J. 865, 909-11 (2005); National Roundtable on the Environment 
and the Economy, Getting to 2050:  Canada's Transition to a Low-Emission Future 24-
25, available at http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/publications/getting-to-2050/intro-page-
getting-to-2050-eng.html (discussing the possibility of upstream cap-and-trade). 
 63 CCAP Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 6. 
64  See U.S.E.P.A., Acid Rain and Related Programs:  2006 Progress 
Report 3 (2006) (“The [acid rain trading] program affected 3,520 electric generating 
units . . . in 2006 (with most emissions produced by 1062 coal-fired units).”), available 
at  http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2006-ARP-Report.pdf.  
65   See Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2007);  
 66 See Tim Hargrave, An Upstream/Downstream Hybrid Approach to 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading (Center for Clean Air Policy, June, 2000), available 
at:  http://www.ccap.org/pdf/Hybrid1.PDF; Jan Mazurek, Cap Carbon Emissions Now 
(Progressive Policy Institute, June 2002), available at:  
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=116&subsecID=149&contentID=25
1136;  
67  This cap would cover emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, and perfluorocarbons.  A separate cap would cover 
emissions of hydrofluorcarbons. 
68  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000). 
 69 See Climate Security Act, §§ 4(7)(A), (B), 1202(a)(1). 
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lead to greenhouse gas emissions.  The bill would require producers and 
importers of petroleum and coal-based transportation fuels to hold an 
allowance for each unit of fuel sold for use in the transportation sector 
that would produce one metric ton of CO2 when combusted.70   Limiting 
the amount of carbon in oil is equivalent to limiting the amount of oil 
itself, since carbon is the primary constituent of oil and the carbon 
content of oil is essentially unchangeable.71  This cap-and-trade program, 
then, would operate like any other DIL, limiting the quantity of the input 
flowing through the entire production stream.72         
Because the Climate Security Act employs a hybrid approach, 
producers can escape the restraint on fossil fuel production by 
purchasing credits reflecting end-of-the-pipe approaches outside the 
transportation sector.  Additionally, under the Act’s offset provisions, 
they can satisfy up to 15 percent of their compliance obligation through 
the purchase of offsets from carbon sequestration achieved through 
altered agriculture or forestry practices.73   Still, the DIL idea has 
powerfully influenced this pending climate change legislation as well as 
numerous other proposals for climate change regulation.74  Indeed, 
because of the logistical difficulties associated with monitoring 
emissions from millions of individual tailpipes, capping emissions on an 
economy-wide basis is impossible without employing at least some 
elements of the DIL idea. 
Similarly, Governor Schwarzeneger has employed a DIL to 
address carbon emissions in the transport sector.  He has promulgated an 
executive order calling for a 10% reduction in the carbon intensity of 
California’s transportation fuels by 2020.75  This order authorizes fossil 
                                                 
 70 See id. at §§ 4(7)(C), 1202(a)(2). 
 71 See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives 
Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 TULSA L. REV. 485, 488 (1994) (noting that 
“nearly all petroleum is 83-86 percent carbon).  
72  Drawing on the literature on upstream and downstream taxes, 
analysts typically refer to schemes like these that impose limits on the production and 
importation of fossil fuels as “upstream cap and trade programs,” highlighting the fact 
that such programs impose regulation early in the production stream rather than at the 
point of end use.  See supra note 51.  The focus remains on limiting the final polluting 
output of the production stream, CO2 emissions, with the carbon content of fuel viewed 
as a proxy for subsequent greenhouse gas emissions.  But, as explained above, because 
the carbon content of oil is unchangeable, these schemes actually limit the amount of 
oil in the economy and are therefore DILs.    
73  See Climate Stewardship Act, § 2403. 
74  See supra note 62. 
 75 Cal. Exec. Order S-01-07, § 1; Alexander E. Farrell et al., A Low-
Carbon Standard for California Part 2:  Policy Analysis (2007), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard/ (providing a detailed policy 
analysis). 
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fuel providers to trade carbon intensity allowances.76  While his 
executive order does not cap total carbon emissions because it does not 
limit the overall amount of fuel used, it does use a DIL to reduce fuel’s 
carbon content.     
 
  2.  Ozone Depletion 
 
 In the 1970s, scientists discovered that chlorine-based 
compounds tend to destroy ozone.77  They hypothesized that emissions 
of these compounds could therefore destroy the ozone layer in the upper 
atmosphere, which protects us from ultraviolet radiation.78  This 
destruction could elevate skin cancer rates,79 interfere with immune 
systems,80 and wreak ecological havoc.81 
 Regulating outputs of ozone depleting chemicals posed daunting 
challenges.  Society used ozone depleters in a wide variety of processes, 
as industrial solvents in many different manufacturing processes (e.g. 
aerospace and electronics);82 as coolants in air conditioners and 
refrigerators;83 as propellants in fire extinguishers, asthmatics’ inhalers, 
and spray deodorants;84 and as an ingredient in styrophone cups and 
                                                 
 76 See id. § 4 (allowing transportation fuel refiners, blenders, producers, 
and importers to earn credits for exceeding carbon intensity targets to sell to 
undercompliers). 
 77 Self-Pressurized Containers; Warning Statements, 41 Fed. Reg. 
52071, 52072-73 (1976) (summarizing the findings of a 1976 National Academy of 
Sciences study of ozone depletion).   
 78 Id. at 52072 (explaining the chemical reaction that destroys ozone).  
 79 Id. at 52073 (predicting “increased incidence” of various forms of 
skin cancer from ozone depletion); Self-Pressurized Consumer Products Containing 
Chlorofluorocarbon Propellants, 42 Fed. Reg. 21807, 21808 (1977) (stating that the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission has “made a preliminary finding that” certain 
propellants present an unreasonable risk of injury from increased skin cancer); 
Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11304 (summarizing a 1977 
National Academy of Science report on skin cancer incidence).  
 80 Ozone Meeting, 49 Fed. Reg. 30823, 30824 (1984) (a National 
Academy of Sciences study suggests a link between ozone depletion and “depression of 
the general human immune responsive system”).   
 81 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66728 (describing specific 
ecological effects and stating that “these and other environmental effects” could be 
“more serious” than the human health effects).  
 82 See Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbons, 43 Fed. Reg. 11318, 
11318 (1978) (suggesting that uses of CFCs as solvents and blowing agents constitutes 
a substantial portion of non-aerosol production).  
 83 See id. at 11318 (stating that about one-half of non-aerosol CFC use 
involved use as refigerants). 
 84 See Self-Pressurized Containers; Warning Statements, 41 Fed. Reg. at  
52071 (stating that “Chlorofluorocarbons are widely used as propellants”); Assessment 
of Carbon Tetrachloride as a Potentially Toxic Pollutant, 50 Fed. Reg. 32621, 32621 
(1985) (stating that carbon tetrachloride has been used as a “fire extinguishing agent”); 
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foams85.  Limiting the emissions from all of these processes and uses 
appeared extremely difficult.   
 Accordingly, the parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer86 (Montreal Protocol) agreed to DILs, 
limits on the inputs of ozone depleting substances, rather than limits on 
the emission of ozone depleting substances into the atmosphere.87  These 
particular DILs limited and eventually phased out the consumption of 
ozone depleting chemicals.88  The Montreal Protocol committed 
developed countries to significant reductions in consumption of leading 
ozone depleting substances.89  Subsequent amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol went further, eventually phasing out the consumption of the 
most important ozone-depleters entirely.90   
The parties to the Montreal Protocol accomplished this phase-out 
of consumption through restrictions on production of the chemicals.  The 
Montreal Protocol defines a country’s consumption of an ozone 
depleting chemical as the quantity of its production minus exports plus 
imports.91 This approach made it much easier to track progress toward 
                                                                                                                       
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone:  Manufacture of Halon Blends, Intentional Release 
of Halon, Technician Training and Disposal of Halon and Halon-Containing 
Equipment, 63 Fed. Reg. 11084, 10085 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Halon Rule] 
(explaining that halons are ozone depleting substances used in fire suppression).  
 85 See Assessment of Chorofluorocarbon-113 as a Potentially Toxic 
Pollutant, 50 Fed. Reg. 24313, 24313 (1985) (describing the blowing of foam as one of 
several principal uses of CFC-113).  
 86  Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29. 
 87 In this case, the inputs and the outputs were actually the same 
chemical substance.  This is a bit unusual, as many processes using chemicals produce 
outputs different in form from the inputs, although usually related.  But, for the most 
part, the regulatory limits did not apply to the outputs.  The relevant law did not take 
the form of emission limits, nor did government enforce most of these laws at the point 
where the chemicals were released in the environment.  Rather they were enforced and 
drafted as input limits, specifically as limits on the production and importation of ozone 
depleting substances, as described below.   
 88 See, e.g. Protection of Statospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30566 
(1988) codified at 40 C.F.R. part 82 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Reduction] (reducing 
production of certain CFCs by first 50 and then 80% and capping the production of 
other CFC at existing levels under the Montreal Protocol); Protection of Stratospheric 
Ozone, 58 Fed. Reg. 65018, 65019, codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 82 (1993) [hereinafter 
1993 Phaseout] (pointing out that the Montreal Protocol as amended requires a 
phaseout of CFCs by 1996).   
 89 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the  Ozone Layer,  
Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art. 2(4) (requiring a 50% 
cut in certain ozone depleting substances beginning in 1998).  
 90 See, e.g., London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol,  June 29, 
1990, arts. 2A(5), art. 5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-9, 30 I.L.M. 537 (requiring that 
developed countries reduce consumption of certain ozone depleters to zero by the year 
2000 and generally requiring developing country compliance ten years later),  
 91 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 3 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (citing art. 1, sec. 6 of the Montreal Protocol).  
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meeting national commitments to phase-out consumption.  It meant that 
measurement occurred upstream, at the point of production, rather than 
downstream, at the point of consumption.   Instead of having to measure 
the use of ozone depleting chemicals downstream in myriad consumer 
products and manufacturing processes, regulators simply had to monitor 
the handful of facilities actually manufacturing ozone depleting inputs 
along with the volume of imports and exports. 92 Thus, the Montreal 
Protocol employed DILs to first limit and then phase-out ozone depleting 
substances.  
 In addition, the Montreal Protocol provided for some trading of 
DILs.93  Specifically, it provided that countries could meet their 
consumption limits jointly.  This provision suggested that one country 
could over-comply if it paid another country to under-comply.  Similarly, 
the United States law implementing the Montreal Protocol allowed 
producers to trade their production allowances.94  While these provisions 
apparently produced no actual trading, their existence reveals the 
possibility of tradable DILs.     
 Scholars recognize the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals as 
the major, some say the only, example of successful international 
environmental protection.95  While a hole in the ozone layer opened up 
as the regime began to operate, developed countries phased out many of 
the principal substances of concern and developing countries began to 
follow suit.  As a result, scientists now expect the ozone layer to heal.96  
Prior to the regimes’ enactment, many considered such drastic action 
impractical.97  They believed that finding substitutes for many of these 
products was impossible or too costly.  In fact, however, the phase-out 
stimulated the substitution of new inputs for the old ones, many of which 
                                                 
 92 See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579 (stating 
that the phaseout was relatively easy to administer, because the producers and importers 
were relatively few in number).  
 93 See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30588 
(discussing and interpreting the Protocol’s “industrial rationalization” provision)  
 94 See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30567.  
 95 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: 
SCIENCE AND STRATEGY vii (2003) (claiming that the ozone depletion regime 
constitutes the only example of successful international environmental law).  
96  See Daniel Pruzin, U.N. Agency Report Says Ozone Hole Above 
Antarctic Shows Signs of Shrinking, 30 INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) 686 (Sept. 5, 2007) 
(World Meteorological Organization expects ozone hole to disappear “sometime 
between 2065 and 2070”). 
97  See Parson, supra note 95, at 9 ("[B]efore regime formation . . 
. it was widely believed that significant cuts in ozone depleting chemicals would be 
difficult and costly, and likely dangerous as well."). 
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proved cheaper than the ozone depleting substances they replaced.98  
Some of the substitutes produce environmental risks.  For example, some 
manufacturers substituted a toxic solvent for more stable ozone depleters 
phased out under the Montreal Protocol.99  The dangers posed by this 
toxic solvent, however, are arguably less severe than the risks associated 
with stratospheric ozone depletion.  And in many cases producers 
avoided any significant risk by substituting soap and water for ozone 
depleting substances.100 
 
  3.  Lead in Gasoline 
 
 While DILs have emerged in just the last two decades in 
connection with efforts to address the hole in the ozone layer and climate 
change, the history of DILs actually goes back at least as far as the 
history of modern environmental law.  In fact, Congress authorized DILs 
in one of the first major pieces of federal environmental legislation ever 
passed—the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments.101  The Clean Air Act 
generally focuses a lot of attention on output limits, such as emission 
standards for tailpipe emissions and pollution from smokestacks.102  But 
Congress also gave EPA the authority to limit fuel additives or 
constituents, i.e. the inputs into gasoline.103  It did this with a particular 
health hazard in mind, the hazard posed by use of lead as a gasoline 
additive.104   
 EPA responded by first limiting the amount of lead that could be 
used as an input into gasoline and later phasing it out.105  The early 
stages of the phase-out simply required reductions in the amount of lead 
                                                 
 98 See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbons, 43 Fed. Reg. at  
11319 (predicting that consumers stand to benefit financially from the use of cheaper 
propellants than those that deplete the ozone layer).  
99  See PARSON, supra note 95, at 182. 
100  See ID. at 4 (noting that production and use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals has fallen 95% with only modest associated cost); David M. Driesen, Does 
Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,094, 
10,103 (2003); David Lee, Trading Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 31, 33 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996). 
 101  See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 
211(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1676, 1698, codified at 42 U.S.C. §7545(c)(1) (2000).  
 102 See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7521 (2000). 
 103 See ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW:  
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 326 (Envtl. L. Inst. 2001); Reitze, supra note 71. 
 104 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“It 
is beyond question that the fuel additive Congress had in mind [in CAA §211(c)(1)(A)] 
was lead.”); Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 281, 294 (2004) (stating that Congress empowered EPA to remove lead from 
gasoline, because it interfered with catalytic converters).  
 105 See Reitze, supra note 71 at 500-05 (providing a detailed history of 
the progression of lead additive standards).  
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in gasoline, a performance standard type DIL.106  Later, however, EPA 
allowed gasoline producers to trade their DILs.107  Unlike in the 
Montreal Protocol case, a significant amount of trading did occur.  EPA 
employed trading of the lead DILs to enhance the flexibility of the 
phase-out and, in particular, to try to ease, or at least delay, the potential 
burden on small refiners.108  
 The Clean Air Act generally requires EPA to write National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to protect public health from 
ubiquitous dangerous pollutants.109  EPA set a NAAQS for lead, 
establishing an atmospheric concentration that in its view would 
adequately protect public health,110 and relied on DILs for lead in 
gasoline to achieve the NAAQS.  Primarily as a result of the lead DILs, 
every populous region in the country has achieved the NAAQS for 
lead.111  By contrast, for most other pollutants EPA has relied primarily 
upon state and federal output limits to achieve the NAAQS.  While some 
regions have achieved the non-lead NAAQS, many areas still have not 
achieved the NAAQS for the most ubiquitous pollutants more than 35 
years after the Clean Air Act’s enactment.112   
                                                 
 106 Id. at 500 (describing an early DIL as providing for an average 
concentration of 1.7 grams of lead per gallon (gpg), decreasing to .5 gpg by 1979).  
 107 See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 
50 Fed. Reg. 13116, 13119 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. part 80); Suzi Kerr & Richard 
Newell, Policy-Induced Technological Adoption:  Evidence from the U.S. Lead 
Phasedown, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 317,  (2003) 
 108 See Driesen, supra note 1, at 317 n. 131 (explaining in detail how 
banking of lead credits lead to delays in reducing emissions).  See generally Morris & 
Stewart, supra note 22, at 1025 (describing lead trading as a means of buying off small 
refiners).  
 109 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001).  
110   See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct 5, 1978); Lead Industries Assoc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(upholding the lead NAAQS). 
 111 See EPA, REPORT ON AIR QUALITY IN NONATTAINMENT AREAS FOR 
2003-2005 COVERING OZONE, PARTICULATE MATTER, CARBON MONOXIDE, SULFUR 
DIOXIDE, NITROGEN DIOXIDE, AND LEAD:  TECHNICAL SUMMARY 24-26 (2006) (revised 
2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/values.html (last visited, June 12, 
2007) [hereinafter nonattainment report].   As of 2007, EPA had designated only two 
areas with a combined population of about 4600 people as not having met the lead 
standard.  Id. at 25.  A third area, Delaware County, Indiana, has recent monitoring data 
indicating a violation of the lead standard, but has not yet been designated as violating 
the standard.  Id.   
 112 See NONATTAINMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 6-7, 15, 20-21, 23 
(listing areas violating the NAAQS for ozone, particulate both fine, PM2.5, and coarse, 
PM10,  and carbon monoxide).  In 2004-2005, all designated nonattainment areas for 
carbon monoxide attained the standard, but one previously compliant area violated it.  
Id. at 22-23.  Because air quality can fluctuate from year to year, EPA generally 
requires several clean years before declaring that an area has attained an air quality 
standard.    
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 The lead phase-out constitutes a public health triumph, having 
greatly reduced blood lead levels, which correlate with neurological 
disorders.113  Because EPA reduced lead through input limits, rather than 
tailpipe controls, the lead phase-out also prevented lead poisoning of 
workers at plants manufacturing lead additives.114  Some of the 
substitutes for lead are toxic and pose some risks of their own, but the 
evidence of the harms associated with lead is generally much more 
robust than the evidence of harm from the substitutes.115  And the federal 
government has continued to employ DILs to address harms associated 
with substitutes for lead and other constituents of gasoline.116  While 
some significant sources of lead remain unabated, the DILs phasing lead 
out of gasoline provide one of environmental law’s most striking success 
stories. 
 
II.  Evaluating DILs. 
 
 This part discusses DILs’ advantages and disadvantages.  This 
discussion not only lays the groundwork for policy-makers’ 
consideration of DILs in particular cases, it also establishes that DILs 
have distinct features that merit further discussion and analysis.   
 
 A.  Advantages  
 
  1.  Administrative Advantages 
 
 DILs’ considerable administrative advantages may have played a 
large role in motivating policy makers to use them to regulate ozone 
depleting chemicals and lead.  Sometimes DILs can prove feasible when 
                                                 
 113 Id. at 24 (reporting a 78% decline in blood lead levels and noting the 
link between lead and seizures, mental retardation, and behavioral disorders).  
 114 See Reitze, supra note 71, at 497-98 (explaining that when lead was 
first introduced it killed or severely poisoned 80 percent of the 49 workers at one 
processing plant).  See also Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, 270 
THE NATION 11, 22-25 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
 115 Professor McGarity states that we have a “dearth of health effects” 
data on MTBE, the most controversial lead substitute that manufacturers chose.  See 
McGarity, supra note 104, at 284, 288, 295.   He concludes that in spite of the risks 
posed by lead substitutes, we are better off with the lead ban than we would be without 
it.  Id. at 311-12.  Furthermore, he points out that we would be still better off if EPA 
had used its authority properly to address MTBE early on.  Id. at 312.   Cf. Reitze, 
supra note 71, at 491 (stating that “it could be claimed that” the replacement of lead 
with aromatic compounds have made fuels “more environmentally harmful.”). 
 116  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(2) (2000).  See also  MTBE Proposed 
Ban, supra note 21.   
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output regulation is not.117  Even where output regulation is also feasible, 
DILs can provide significant administrative cost savings. 
 The administrative advantages of DILs stem from three sources.  
First, it is often simpler to monitor inputs than outputs.  Indeed, in some 
instances, monitoring outputs is simply impossible.  This is true of ozone 
depleting chemicals, for example.  Ozone depleters get released into the 
atmosphere as “fugitive emissions,” i.e. emissions escaping at multiple 
places in a production processes or after use of a product.118  Monitoring 
these emissions was impracticable both because of measurement 
problems and because of the large number of heterogeneous sites 
potentially requiring monitoring.  By contrast, monitoring the 
production, imports, and exports of ozone depleting substances in order 
to administer a DIL was relatively straightforward.  Accordingly, the 
parties to the Montreal Protocol chose DILs to address ozone depletion 
in part to avoid the monitoring problems that made output regulation 
impracticable.119 
 In other instances, monitoring outputs is feasible, but more 
expensive than monitoring inputs.  For example, monitoring the amount 
of coal burned by a power plant is undoubtedly cheaper and less 
complicated than monitoring the amounts of various pollutants escaping 
from the smoke stack.120 
 Second, because a DIL can simultaneously reduce a whole series 
of pollution outputs along a production stream, it can reduce 
administrative costs by obviating the need for separate regulatory 
programs for each polluting output.121  Thus, a DIL limiting or phasing 
out oil consumption, for example, might eliminate or reduce the need for 
regulatory programs to minimize the impacts of drilling, to prevent 
spills, to limit the emissions of hazardous air pollutants, particulate 
matter, and smog precursors from oil refineries,122 to prevent leaks from 
                                                 
 117 See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluroalkanes, 42 Fed. Reg. at 
21547 (finding a prohibition on the manufacture of fully halogenated 
chlorofluoroalkane propellants the “only practicable regulatory alternative.”).  
 118 Cf. Morriss & Stewart, supra note 22, at 1041-42 (describing fugitive 
emissions associated with oil refining).  
119  See supra notes 82 to 92 and accompanying text. 
 120 See Byron Swift, Command Without Control:  Why Cap-and-Trade 
Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10330, 10331 (2001). 
 121 See Stavins, supra note 51, at 20 (explaining that an upstream 
regulation point reduces administrative costs).  Cf. Mcallister, supra note 40, at 304-305 
(discussing how the RECLAIM emissions trading program generated high 
administrative costs, even though it only addressed two pollutants). 
122  See 40 C.F.R. part 63 (2006). 
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underground storage tanks at service stations,123 to require vapor 
recovery devices at service stations,124 to impose standards for an array 
of different pollutants from vehicles,125 and to require periodic 
inspections of vehicle emission control systems.126  Of course, the scope 
and stringency of a DIL affects the extent to which that DIL obviates the 
need for other regulatory programs.127      
 Third, DILs will often allow government to realize administrative 
cost savings by moving the locus of regulation upstream.128  The 
environmental tax literature has observed that upstream taxes generally 
have lower administrative costs than downstream taxes,129 and the same 
observation holds true for upstream DILs.130   A supply chain often 
                                                 
 123 See MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16100-101 (describing the 
regulations seeking, with limited to success, to eliminate leaks from underground 
storage tanks); McGarity, supra note 104, at 292-94 (same).   
124  See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 
Envtl. Lawyer 309, 319-20 (2000) (discussing regulation requiring vapor recovery 
devices).  
125  See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000) (directing EPA to regulate emissions 
from motor vehicles). 
 126  See Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp 2d 705, 708-09 
(E.D.Pa. 2002) (discussing Pennsylvania’s obligation to implement vehicle inspection 
and maintenance program under Clean Air Act).     
127  DILs reduce administrative costs by obviating the need for multiple 
regulatory programs most obviously when the DIL phases out an input.  Such a DIL 
may eliminate the need for a lot of output-based regulation entirely.  When a DIL only 
limits production of an input, the relationship between the DIL and avoided cost will be 
more subtle and complex.  For example, imagine a DIL limiting gasoline consumption 
by 10%.  Society probably would continue to require output regulation of vehicle 
exhaust, even if gasoline use dropped.  The DIL, however, would contribute to 
something like a 10% decline in vehicle exhaust.  In principle, the regulator could now 
reduce the control efficiency of the vehicle exhaust regulations in response in order to 
save money.  This would imply that the DIL produced a cost savings in vehicle exhaust 
regulation.  Of course, the regulator might instead keep the regulation in tact.  If so, the 
DIL would produce an additional benefit which would help justify it. 
 128 See, e.g., 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579 
(finding that engineering controls would be “difficult to administer” because thousands 
of firms use CFCs).  
129  See supra note 45. 
 130 See Arnold W. Reitze, Should the Clean Air Act be Used to Turn 
Petroleum Addicts into Alcoholics?, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10745, 10746 
(2006) (fuel additive requirements are relatively easy to enforce because of the 
centralization of refining and distribution); CBO Report, supra note 51, at viii (claiming 
that an “upstream” allowance requirement minimizes the government’s administrative 
cost); Hargrave, supra note 66, at 6 (noting that an upstream approach “would be more 
workable that a downstream system because it would include fewer regulated . . . 
entities.”); CCAP, Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 6-7 (finding an upstream 
approach to carbon trading “more workable” than a downstream approach, because it 
would regulate far fewer sources).   For trading programs, however, the number of 
actors must remain large enough to create a viable market if trading’s cost saving 
potential is to be realized. See Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing 
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begins with a small number of homogeneous actors producing 
fundamental inputs, but ends in products used by numerous 
heterogeneous businesses or consumers.  When this is true, imposing an 
upstream DIL will generate administrative cost savings.   
 Accordingly,  DILs may have great utility even when output 
limits or taxes are feasible.131  Governments have limited resources 
available for regulating and monitoring pollution.132  Using these 
resources efficiently can be very important to realizing environmental 
goals.133     
 
  2.  Efficiency Advantages 
 
 Because output regulation focuses on each polluting output in 
isolation, it can fail to take into account benefits attributable to 
reductions in other pollution outputs along the same production stream.  
This can result in an inefficient choice of pollution reduction strategies.   
By broadening the focus of analysis to the production stream as a whole, 
DILs tend to reduce such inefficiencies.      
 Where an environmental problem stems from a single production 
process producing a single polluting output, a DIL might prove 
inefficient to the extent that it limits a polluter’s choices with respect to 
what kind of pollution control strategy to employ.  An output-based 
regulation allows the polluter a choice of complying either through the 
adoption of end-of-the-pipe controls or through pollution prevention 
(changing or reducing inputs).134  A DIL, on the other hand, requires the 
polluter to adopt pollution prevention strategies.135  Where end-of-the-
pipe controls offer a cheaper method for reducing the single polluting 
output, a DIL will prove inefficient.136 
                                                                                                                       
Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe:  Lessons from Economic Literature and 
International Experiences, 43 Ecological Econ. 213, 215  (2002) (large number of 
participants required for successful emissions trading program in order for market to 
benefit from significant abatement cost differences among firms and to lower the risk of 
monopolistic manipulation); Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 422-23 (same).  
 131 See, e.g., 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66729-30 (listing 
possible out-based technologies for limiting CFC emissions, but concluding that growth 
in CFC use could offset gains made with an output-based approach).   
 132 See 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579 (EPA could not possibly regulate 5,000 to 
10,000 CFC customers, because of resource limitations).  
 133 See id. (regulating CFC customers was not feasible).  
134  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 135 See CCAP, Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 2 an upstream 
trading program provides no incentive to use “end use emission treatment 
technologies”). 
 136 Robert Stavins, in advancing an upstream cap and trade approach, 
argues that the point of regulation does not influence the cost of reductions.  Stavins, 
supra note 51, at 18.  Stavins makes this point in the context of a proposal that mixes 
upstream and downstream regulation, rather than a pure DIL.  See id. at 17-18 
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 More often than not, however, the input that contributes to an 
environmental problem is part of a production stream that produces 
multiple pollution outputs.  In the context of a pollution stream, the 
efficiency analysis is quite different.  In that case, DILs will often offer 
efficiency advantages over output-based regulation.      
 A highly simplified hypothetical example will help to 
demonstrate the point.  Imagine that an electric power plant is faced with 
output-based regulation requiring it to reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions 
by half.  Imagine that the cost of switching half its generating capacity to 
wind power is $10 million and the cost of installing scrubbers is $4 
million.   Clearly, the power plant will choose to install scrubbers rather 
than switch to wind power, because that option involves the least cost to 
the power plant.  Yet, for society as a whole, the benefits associated with 
decreasing coal production (reduced deaths and injuries to coal miners, 
reduced ecological destruction from mining) might well outweigh the 
extra $6 million cost associated with the switch to wind power.137  In 
such a case, the pollution prevention strategy of switching to wind power 
would clearly be better for society as a whole. Hence, plants acting cost 
effectively with respect to a particular output-based regulation, may not 
be acting efficiently with respect to the full range of externalities 
associated with a production stream. 
 Under output-based regulation, polluters usually base their  
pollution control strategy choices on an incomplete accounting of costs 
and benefits that fails to take into account the full social benefits that 
would accrue from a pollution prevention strategy’s reduction of other 
polluting outputs along the production stream.  If all of the externalities 
associated with those outputs were fully internalized through perfectly 
efficient output-based regulation, then the power plant’s decision about 
what pollution control strategy to pursue would reflect the full range of 
relevant social costs and benefits, because the social harms caused by 
coal mining would be internalized into the price of coal.  But 
comprehensive regulation of all relevant pollution outputs at the same 
                                                                                                                       
(proposing a credit for post-combustion emission reductions, such as through carbon 
capture and storage).  And he may be correct in that context.  But he acknowledges, in a 
footnote, that the point of regulation can make a difference in some cases.  Id. n. 23.  A 
pure DIL would not provide a credit for an end-of-the-pipe emission reduction option, 
and therefore could prove more costly in the short-term with respect to a single 
pollutant with high input control costs and low output control costs.  While a pollution 
tax may impose uniform cost regardless of the point of imposition, see id. (trying to 
support a conclusion about regulation by reference to basic textbook economics of tax 
policy), regulatory costs can vary with the point of imposition.        
 137 John M. Broder, Rule to Expand Mountain Top Coal Mining, N.Y. 
Times A1 (August 23, 2007) (discussing mountaintop removal’s ecological impacts); 
Cara Buckley and Susan Saulny, Finding Miners Alive is "Totally Unlikely," Owner 
Says, N.Y. Times A12 (August 23, 2007); Ravaging Appalachia, N.Y. Times A 17 
(August 27, 2007) (editorial discussing  mountaintop removal’s ecological effects).  
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time usually proves beyond the capacity of government.  Often 
governments leave some pollution unregulated,138 or they leave 
regulation that does exist unenforced.139  And even when they attempt to 
regulate comprehensively, they almost always regulate one type of 
pollutant at a time.140  This makes it impossible for industry to have 
complete compliance cost information at any one time that might justify 
investments in whole new approaches to avoid multiple regulatory 
impacts. Accordingly, in a second-best world of incomplete 
internalization of externalities, output-based regulation, with its 
piecemeal focus on individual polluting outputs, may produce inefficient 
results.141  By expanding the field of vision to encompass an entire 
production stream, DILs may often produce more efficient results for 
society as a whole.  
 Because commentators usually associate emissions trading with 
pollution prevention,142 one might think that output-based trading solves 
the problem of polluters choosing options with only narrowly defined 
benefits.  In fact, however, polluters even under trading often choose 
end-of-the-pipe control when it’s cheaper than pollution prevention at 
realizing reductions in the pollutants the program targets.  This helps 
explain why almost two-thirds of the credits generated in developing 
countries for trading in carbon markets created by the Kyoto Protocol 
have come from end-of-the-pipe controls, which have been cheaper than 
                                                 
138  See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons:  A 
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
139  See Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stillwell, & Oran Young, 
Compliance, Rule of Law , and Good Governance in MAKING LAW WORK: 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 47-51 (Durwood 
Zaelke, et al., eds. 2005) (discussing pervasive problem on under-enforcement of 
environmental laws throughout the world); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage 
Seriously:  Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 297 (1999) (same). 
140  Typically, separate statutes govern pollution in different media.  
Thus, at the federal level in the U.S., the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution, 42 
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000), the Clean Water Act regulates water pollution, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251 et seq. (2000), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulates solid 
waste disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6902 et seq. (2000). 
 141 See MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16100 (justifying a ban on 
MTBE in part because numerous government programs to prevent gasoline leaks and 
spills “from the vast array of units and individuals handling gasoline” could not prevent 
releases into the environment).  
142  See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through 
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 155, 166 (1988) (noting that 
technology-based regulation requires installation of “pollution control” technology, 
while “economic incentives” encourage “new products or production technologies”); 
Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 
J.L. & COM. 585, 592 (1996) (contrasting the “existing technology-based system[’s]” 
emphasis on “end of pipe” controls with trading’s encouragement of “process changes 
and conservation”). 
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using renewable energy as a substitute for dirty inputs.143  Similarly, 
while polluters subject to traditional performance standard regulation 
have sometimes complied by employing pollution prevention options not 
anticipated by regulators,144 they have more often complied by using 
“end-of-the-pipe” controls.  This suggests that pollution prevention is not 
always cheap.145  Output-based regulation makes input reduction 
voluntary and generally induces it only when it offers a relatively cheap 
way of meeting a narrowly defined goal. 
  
  
  3.  Fundamental Change and Innovation 
 
 We have already alluded to DIL’s ability to stimulate innovation.  
But the idea that DILs may perform better than the alternatives in 
stimulating innovation requires elaboration.  And the underlying 
assumption that innovation has more value than a beneficial non-
innovative approach will receive some attention as well.    
 We define innovation as a non-obvious departure from prior 
approaches.146  Innovation includes not just invention, but also use of a 
new technology.  One can distinguish innovation from diffusion, the 
spread of well understood practices.   
 Technological changes, whether innovative or not, can either 
involve incremental improvements in existing approaches or a 
fundamental change in how society produces, uses, and delivers goods 
and services.  Thus, for example, minor changes in the constituents of 
gasoline to improve its environmental characteristics constitute 
incremental change.  A decision to make vehicles that run on electricity 
rather than gasoline, on the other hand, involves a fundamental change.  
Fundamental changes alter multiple steps in a production stream and 
                                                 
 143 See David M. Driesen, Market Liberalism and Sustainable 
Development’s Shotgun Wedding:  Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 
INDIANA L. J. 1 , __(2008) (forthcoming) (characterizing 64% of credits as coming from 
end-of-the-pipe control).  The data supporting this conclusion come from Joergen 
Fenhann, UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, CDM Pipeline 
Overview (July 2007), available at http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/ 
CDMpipeline.xls and the website updates this data frequently.  
144  See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GAUGING 
CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH—AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH, OTA-ENV-635, 57-58 
(1995) (discussing examples of pollution prevention measures in response to output-
based standards). 
 145 See Ochsner, supra note 12, at 591; Nicholas A. Ashford & George 
R. Heaton Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 139-140 (Summer 1983).    
146  Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)(patentable invention must be non-obvious 
departure from prior art).   
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may also affect what the end consumer does.  So, for example, a shift to 
electric vehicles would eliminate gasoline use, thereby reducing refinery 
emissions, oil spills, and so on, but conversely increase electricity use, 
thereby raising power plant emissions.  It might also change what 
consumers do, relieving them of the responsibility to go to gasoline 
stations while requiring them to plug in a car overnight and perhaps take 
shorter trips.  While the line between fundamental and incremental 
change will not always be as sharp as these examples suggest, the 
distinction will prove useful in evaluating DILs.   
 In general, pollution prevention is more likely to involve 
fundamental technological change than end-of-the-pipe controls.  
Because pollution prevention reduces or eliminates inputs, it involves 
making changes to the production process itself.   End-of-the-pipe 
technology, on the other hand, tends not to alter existing processes 
significantly, but instead consists of an add-on.  Under output-based 
regulation, firms can choose whether to meet regulatory standards 
through pollution prevention or end-of-the-pipe controls,147 and 
frequently they choose the latter.  Since DILs require firms to use 
pollution prevention techniques rather than end-of-the-pipe controls, 
DILs tend to produce more fundamental change and more innovation 
than output-based regulation.148  The magnitude of the fundamental 
change will depend upon the stringency of the DIL,149 but a DIL 
focusing on a fundamental input like gasoline will always produce some 
fundamental change.  By contrast, emission limits tend not to produce 
fundamental changes unless they are so stringent and expensive that they 
make existing approaches non-viable.   
 Scholars have recognized that the phase-outs of lead and ozone 
depleting chemicals stimulated innovations.150  In fact, both of these 
                                                 
147  See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 148 As between output-based regulatory instruments, emissions trading 
tends to spur even less fundamental change than performance standards, as one of us 
has shown in several previous articles.  See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and 
Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LESSONS FROM 
20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds. 2006); Driesen, 
supra note 96.  This is because fundamental change is often costly, and emissions 
trading favors the least costly approaches.     
 149 See, e.g., 1993 Phaseout, supra note 88, at 65025 (predicting that 
acceleration of a phaseout schedule for ozone depleting substances would accelerate 
technological development).  
 150 See, e.g., PARSON, supra note 92, at 184, 186, 188, 190 (discussing 
specific technological changes made in response to the phaseout of ozone depleting 
chemicals); Reynaldo Forte & Robert Livernash, Chilling Out, in OZONE PROTECTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 97, 98 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996) 
(same); Suzi Kerr & Richard Newell, Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence 
from the U.S. Lead Phasedown, 51 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 317, 322-23 (2003) 
(describing the technological responses to the ultimate ban of lead in gasoline).    
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DILs stimulated fundamental changes in the early stages of the program, 
before the regulators required full phase-outs.151  Even mild DILs tend to 
stimulate innovation, since they demand some basic change.  Stringent 
DILs demand even more use of innovative technologies, often 
innovations that involve fundamental changes in inputs.     
 This raises the question of whether fundamental change is 
superior to incremental change.  Incremental change often proves more 
cost effective than fundamental change in the short run.  It allows for the 
continued use of existing capital stock, already developed human capital 
(e.g. expertise in the mechanics of internal combustion engines), and 
experience with an existing technology’s properties.  In the long-run, 
however, fundamental change can prove better.  Fundamental change 
can produce economic growth by stimulating new industries.  It can also 
improve the quality of life over time and may be essential to addressing 
extremely difficult environmental challenges.  Finally, a DIL’s capacity 
to solve multiple environmental problems at once through pollution 
prevention is at its highest when that DIL stimulates fundamental 
technological change. 
 Innovation, whether fundamental or not, can lower the costs of 
producing goods and services over time.  Innovation can also improve 
the quality of goods and services.   Innovations, however, often prove 
costly in the short run even if they either reduce costs in the long run or 
produce quality improvements justifying their cost.  While much of the 
instrumental choice literature tends to associate relentless pursuit of cost 
effectiveness with innovation,152 one of us has argued elsewhere that 
                                                 
 151 See, e.g.,EPA, ACHIEVEMENTS IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE 
PROTECTION: PROGRESS REPORT 15 (2007) (describing DuPont as leading the chemical 
manufacturing industry search for alternative by abandoning CFCs before the Montreal 
Protocol was signed in 1987); PARSON, supra note 92, at 40, 183-191 (describing 
various innovations and dating them prior to the ozone phase-out); René Kemp, 
Technology and Environmental Policy: Innovation Effects of Past Policies and 
Suggestions for Improvement, in OECD, INNOVATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 35, 35 
(2000) (stating generally that firms searched for CFC alternatives 10 years before the 
ban); Reynaldo Forte & Robert Livernash, Chilling Out, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 97, 98 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996) (explaining 
the York, a major manufacturer of commercial air conditioning systems, introduced a 
“chiller” using an alternative HCFC as early as 1988). Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using 
Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 436 
(1985) (reporting three innovative responses to the lead phasedown in the late 1970s).    
152  See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming 
Environmental Law:  The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 171, 183 (1988); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading:  
Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-35 (1988); 
Hahn & Stavins, supra note 35, at 13; Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Global 
Climate Change:  How Can Governments Address a Global Environmental Problem, 
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 302-03. 
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innovation and short term cost effectiveness often conflict.153  For 
example, we have relatively cheap personal computers (PCs) because of 
decisions to build very expensive supercomputers, which produced the 
experience that ultimately made PCs viable.154  PCs are still more 
expensive than typewriters, but they make revisions of documents much 
easier.  Hence, the PC example illustrates the tendency of initially 
expensive innovation to lead to both cost reductions over time and 
enhanced quality.  The same pattern prevails with respect to innovation 
addressing environmental problems.  Renewable energy, for example, 
offers an example of initially expensive innovation delivering high 
environmental quality, insofar as it provides energy while reducing 
emissions for a variety of pollutants to zero.  While it has proven initially 
expensive, its costs have fallen over time.155  Hence, innovation has 
value that may justify choosing it over more conventional approaches, 
even when the conventional approaches are cheaper in the short term.  
This value may justify DILs or other measures that may be needed to 
overcome inertia produced by the short term cost effectiveness of 
sticking with conventional approaches.    
 
 B. Disadvantages 
 
1.  Disruption. 
 
  While fundamental changes can dramatically improve 
environmentally quality and reduce costs over time, they tend to disrupt 
existing processes.   Indeed, the material above defines fundamental 
change as that which changes the nature of multiple processes all in one 
blow.156  And DILs tend to spur more fundamental change than output-
based regulation.  
 Indeed, Congress has recognized that DILs have this potential for 
disruption and has limited their use because of it.  When Congress 
constructed a system to address the treatment and disposal of solid waste 
                                                 
153  See Driesen, supra note 148; Driesen, supra note 100. 
154  See LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER 
ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE 19-25 (2d ed. 2006) (the first supercomputer built 
with transistors cost $10 million, but integrated circuits and then microprocessors to 
minituarize transistors dropped the price and made personal computers possible);  see 
generally Sabine Messner, Endogenized Technological Learning in an Energy Systems 
Model, 7 J. Evolutionary Econ. 291, 293 (1997) (describing “learning by doing” as 
“among the best empirically corroborated phenomena characterizing technological 
change in industry.”). 
 155 See, e.g., Sunlit Uplands:  Wind and Solar Power Are Flourishing, 
Thanks to Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST 16 (June 2, 2007) (wind power costs have fallen 
from $2 per kilowatt hour (kwh) in the 1970s to 5-8 cents per kwh; solar power costs 
have dropped from $20 per watt of production capacity in the 1970s to $2.70 in 2004).  
156  See supra notes 146 to 147 and accompanying text. 
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in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act157, it recognized that 
pollution prevention (conservation, in the words of the statute’s title) 
could help us avoid expensive and incomplete treatment of solid waste 
altogether.158  Yet, Congress generally declined to give EPA the 
authority to promulgate DILs to realize these benefits.  Instead, it 
required generators of hazardous waste (an important subset of solid 
waste) to reduce use of the inputs that led to hazardous waste only to the 
extent the generator deems practicable.159  In other words, it left the 
decision about whether and how much to reduce inputs to industry, 
rather than to EPA.160     
 Congress understood that industry would only carry out input 
reduction under such a mandate when doing so would save the industry 
money.161  This means that even when more input reduction would be 
optimal for society because it would produce additional benefits along 
the production stream, industry would not limit dirty inputs. 
 The legislative history shows that concerns about disruption of 
industry processes drove Congress to forego environmentally and 
economically desirable DILs in this context.162  The selection of inputs 
into production processes requires expertise and judgment about how to 
make a safe and effective product.163  The Congressional rejection of 
mandatory input reduction reflects concern that EPA, if given authority 
to require input reduction, might unwittingly make decisions that unduly 
interfered with sound production decisions.  Of course, Congress has 
authorized interference with production decisions in order to realize 
environmental benefits when it views an environmental problem as 
sufficiently serious (as in the lead and ozone cases).164  Yet, the 
                                                 
 157 Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k 
(2000). 
158  See 42 U.S.C. 6902(b) (2000) (establishing a national policy favoring 
pollution pollution prevention over disposal); S. Rep. 98-284, at 65 (1983) (describing 
treatment as something only necessary for "wastes that are generated"); see also EPA, 
Guidance to Hazardous Waste Generators on the Elements of a Waste Minimization 
Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 31114, 31115 (May 18, 1993) (explaining that minimizing waste 
generation reduces waste management costs). 
 159 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (2000).  
 160  See S. Rep. 98-284, at 66 (1983) (describing the provisions as 
encouraging “generators to voluntarily” reduce toxic waste). 
 161 See id. (stating that the decision about what is “economically 
practicable” will be made by the generator of hazardous waste and “is not subject to 
subsequent re-evaluation.”)  
 162  See id. (this provision does not authorize EPA to “interfere with or 
intrude into” individual generators’ “production process or production decisions”)  
 163 See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730.  
164 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 11 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (when EPA 
acts under the Clean Air Act provision authorizing it to impose DILs on fuel additives, 
“it is essentially telling manufacturers how to make their fuels, a task Congress felt the 
Agency should enter upon only with trepidation”). 
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possibility of unwise intrusion is present with a DIL to a greater extent 
than it would be with output regulation,165 This possibility often leads 
regulators to rely on voluntary approaches to realize input reduction 
goals.     
Even voluntary input reduction, however, carries with it more 
risk of disruption than an end-of-the-pipe approach.  Voluntary input 
reduction avoids disruption of the volunteer’s manufacturing process, 
because manufacturers will only choose pollution prevention moves that 
they can manage effectively.  But input reductions, even voluntary ones, 
can produce disruptions, including unemployment in other industries.  
Input reduction can cause a manufacturer to stop purchasing a particular 
supply.166  If the input it chooses to reduce or eliminate turns out to be 
the sole product or the major product of a supplier, voluntary input 
reduction can cause the supplier to layoff labor or even shut down.167   
While the pollution prevention literature pays little attention to 
this problem, Congress has paid attention to it on occasion.  For years, it 
insisted on regulating sulfur dioxide from power plants using an end-of-
the-pipe approach, because of concerns that a more flexible performance 
standard might lead electric utilities to stop using high sulfur coal, which 
could reduce mining jobs in regions producing it.  When Congress 
finally authorized emissions trading to address acid rain, it recognized 
that this approach might encourage wider use of low sulfur coal, thereby 
threatening miners’ jobs.  It therefore provided economic aid for miners 
impacted by these voluntary input reduction choices under emissions 
trading.168  Any input reduction approach, whether voluntary or not, can 
disrupt labor markets.   
 While this problem may justify coupling especially disruptive 
DILs with some kind of transition aid, this labor disruption problem 
should not count as a substantial reason to refrain from using DILs.  
DILs may lead not only to job losses, but to offsetting job increases as 
well.  DILs stimulate demand for substitutes for the restricted input, 
which may generate employment in the industries supplying the 
alternative input.169  Indeed, some amount of disruption is inevitable in 
                                                 
 165 See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluroalkanes:  Temporary 
Exemption for Automatic Timed-Release Isecticide Dispensing System Used in Long-
term Storage of Tobacco, 46 Fed. Reg. 27120, 27121 (1981).   
 166 See, e.g., Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 
11311.   
 167 See id. .  
168  ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 552 (4th ed. 2003). 
 169 See,.e.g., Mikael Roman, What Order in Progress?  Brazilian Energy 
Policies and Climate Change in the Beginning of the 21st Century, Centre for Climate 
Science and Policy Research, Report No. 07:02  (2007), available at 
www.scpr.se/publications (Brazilian support for ethanol as an alternative to gasoline 
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competitive markets.  Desirable economic changes disrupt labor markets 
all the time.  No one would ever suggest that we should have avoided the 
development of personal computers, because it hurt the business of 
typewriter manufacturers.  It may be that we should make better 
transitional arrangements for workers regardless of the cause of 
disruption.  Or perhaps we shouldn’t provide such assistance in the 
interest of having flexible labor markets.  But it makes no sense to 
eschew disruption of labor markets for the sake of environmental 
benefits, while allowing disruption of labor markets in pursuit of all 
kinds of other benefits. 
 The disruption DILs may cause is generally greatest when they 
demand fundamental change.  But this is not always true.  In the case of 
ozone depleting chemicals, many of the firms manufacturing ozone 
depleters also made substitutes.170  As a result, phase-outs of ozone 
depleting chemicals caused little disruption of labor markets. While they 
did disrupt manufacturing processes, they did so quite productively.  By 
contrast, the phaseout of lead involved less fundamental change, but may 
have put some firms out of business.  The degree of disruption depends 
partly upon the nature of changes demand and partly upon market 
structure and technological factors.171   
 In sum, DILs’ disruptive capacity may constitute a disadvantage.  
But DILs’ history suggests that the positive benefits, environmental and 
economic, may sometimes justify the disruption.      
 
2.  Risk/Risk Problems 
 
 While the reduction or elimination of dirty inputs can provide 
multiple benefits, it can also create new risks.172  Generally, firms choose 
inputs to perform some function.173  If they must eliminate or reduce an 
input, they will usually introduce some substitute input to perform a 
similar function.174  That substitute can carry risks of its own.175  The use 
                                                                                                                       
produced some 720,000 jobs directly and some 200,000 indirectly between 1978 and 
1990). 
 170 See Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 
11311.   
 171 See id.; Protection of Stratospheric Ozone:  Adjusting Allowances for 
Class I Substances for Export to Article 5 Countries, 71 Fed. Reg. 49395 (2006).  
 172 See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 407 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs,  63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1533. 1541-42 (1996) (regulatory bans can lead to introduction of risky substitutes).  
See, e.g., 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730.  
 173 See, e.g., Protection of Statospheric Ozone:  Listing of Substitutes in 
the Foam Sector, 67 Fed. Reg. 447703, 47709 (2002).  
 174 See Helfland, supra note 42, at 15.  See, e.g., Protection of 
Stratospheric Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 SNAP Rule].  
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of toxic substitutes for ozone depleters and for lead in gasoline provides 
an example of this problem.176 
 The oft repeated claim that risk/risk problems pervade 
environmental law177 suggests that DILs do not differ in this respect 
from other regulatory instruments.  Risk/risk problems, however, do not 
pervade all environmental law equally.  While all environmental 
instruments can create ancillary risks, DILs have special problems in this 
regard that merit consideration.178 
 Because DILs demand a change in inputs, they can provide 
unusually great opportunities to avoid risks associated with current 
technologies.  But this demand for change also suggests a capacity to 
create fundamental new problems.179  Input change may produce either 
net environmental gains or serious ancillary risks.180  Still, experience 
suggests that targeting serious risks through DILs has often worked well 
from a risk/risk perspective. The lead and ozone DILs both produced 
risk/risk tradeoffs that ultimately proved beneficial.  In both instances, by 
targeting very serious risks, we made enormous progress in protecting 
public health and the environment, even though producers created some 
arguably less severe ancillary risks in the process.181       
 Like any regulation that provides firms with freedom to make 
technological choices, DILs have significant potential to stimulate 
introduction of ancillary risks without public evaluation.  When 
government imposes a work practice standard, it makes the choice about 
what new technology will be employed, and its general responsibility to 
avoid arbitrary decisions combined with specific statutory language 
                                                                                                                       
 175 See Helfland, supra note 42, at 15 (substitution of inputs can increase 
“damages.”).  See, e.g.,1997 SNAP Rule, supra note 174.  Professor Helfland also 
discusses the possibility that a restricted input might contribute to pollution in some 
uses, but not in others, using water as an example.  Helfland, supra note 42, at 15.  This 
problem probably would not arise frequently if one regulates dirty inputs, substance 
with a clear association with pollutants of concern, rather than innocuous substances 
like water.  Similarly her concern that eliminating polluting inputs that complement 
abating inputs could have perverse results, see id., should not arise often if regulated 
inputs are carefully chosen, see id. at 16 (perverse results are not likely in some 
contexts).   
176  See supra notes 99 and 115 and accompanying text. 
 177 AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990); Sunstein, 
supra note 172; RISK VERSUS RISK:  TRDEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds. 1995).  Cf. ALBERT O. 
HISRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION (1991). 
 178 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 32 n. 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(Congress specifically required EPA to evaluate substitutes in writing fuel DILs to 
avoid “counterproductive results”).  
 179 See, e.g., 1997 Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 27876-87, 27880-81.  
 180 See, e.g. Halon Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11089.   
181  See supra notes 77 to 116 and accompanying text. 
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directed at risk/risk tradeoffs will usually require it to consider ancillary 
risks.182  But when government imposes a DIL requiring a phase-out of a 
particular substance, producers are free to introduce any substitute they 
choose to replace it, unless some other regulation restrains them.183  This 
choice of substitutes can occur largely without public oversight.  While 
DILs share this defect with most output-based regulation, including 
emissions trading, pollution taxes, and performance standards,184 the 
problem may be worse in the context of DILs since they are more likely 
to spur fundamental technological change.   
 Nonetheless, one should not leap to the conclusion that we should 
eliminate private technological choices by eliminating DILs to assure 
public evaluation of important ancillary risks.  First, private actors have 
some incentives to consider the risks of substitute inputs, because of 
fears of liability or future regulation.  Private creativity may itself 
contribute to risk avoidance.  Furthermore, while risk/risk tradeoffs exist, 
it does not follow that the new risks will be worse than the old ones, as 
the lead and ozone examples demonstrate.  Finally, regulators can 
prevent DIL-related ancillary risks by prohibiting certain substitutes or 
through subsequent regulation.185   
 We may need some reforms to avoid serious new risks, such as 
improvement in the generation of information about new toxic 
substances, or a requirement for some government evaluation of 
alternative new technologies before DILs are imposed.186  There is a 
tension, however, between the desire to evaluate all risks of substitutes 
thoroughly in advance and the desire to use private initiative to promptly 
reduce known serious risks.187             
                                                 
182  See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2) (2000). 
 183 Cf. 1997 Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874.  
 184 See Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B. Stewart, & Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe:  Technology-Based versus Market-Based 
Approaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1992) (describing "market-based 
approaches" as those that leave "the choice of . . . specific  technologies . . .to private 
actors")    
 185 See, e.g. Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at  27876-87, 27880-81; Protection 
of Stratospheric Ozone:  Listing of Substitutes for Ozone Depleting Chemicals, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 5491, 5493 (1998). 
186  Congress imposed just such a requirement in the context of the lead 
DIL, requiring EPA, before prohibiting a fuel additive, to make a finding that “any fuel 
or fuel additive likely to replace the prohibited one will ‘not endanger the public health 
or welfare to the same or greater degree.’”  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 11 
(D.C.Cir. 1976).  In response to a DIL phasing out asbestos, the United States Court of 
Appeals demanded that EPA evaluate available information about substitute products’ 
risks.  See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991). 
See also Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874. 
 187 See Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 
11309.   
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  3.  Political Feasibility 
 
 DILs, can pose formidable political challenges, because they can 
significantly disrupt prevailing practices.  This suggests that policy-
makers might best employ DILs when society needs disruption to solve 
serious long-term environmental problems and not when less disruptive 
mechanisms appear adequate.   
 Opponents may wish to paint DILs as akin to Soviet-style 
economic planning.  Policy-makers should recognize that such charges 
are ill-founded.  Under a regime of central economic planning, the 
government chooses targets for the production of desirable outputs and 
dictates the inputs to be used for these purposes.  DILs, in contrast, do 
not involve production targets or government selection of inputs.  
Instead, under a DIL, government simply limits the use of a particular 
input, leaving private parties free to choose any economically and 
environmentally desirable substitute.  And tradable DILs use a market-
mechanism to further enhance private sector flexibility.  Still, unfounded 
charges have considerable potential to create political obstacles. 
 Any judgment about political practicality, however, must remain 
contingent upon the particular time and place.  Even if DILs do not pass 
a political feasibility test in Washington, D.C. circa 2008, they may pass 
such a test in California, in Sweden, or perhaps in Washington, D.C. 
after a new election or another decade of climate-related disasters.  It is 
not too soon to start a debate about them among academics and 
policymakers.    
 
 
III.  DILs’ Promise 
 
Now that we have defined DILs, examined some historical 
examples of their use, and outlined some of their advantages and 
disadvantages, we outline some thinking about the nature of DILs’ 
potential contribution to environmental law’s future.  We will first 
explore what sorts of problems they might best address.  We will then 
show how the mechanism can reshape our thinking about environmental 
law.   
 
A.  When are DILs Appropriate? 
 
We will first discuss a general theory of when DILs may prove 
most helpful.  We will then offer a tentative proposal for a DIL limiting 
oil production and consumption and offer some other ideas for future 
DIL-related research.  Our proposals remain tentative, because a 
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thorough exploration of any one proposal would require an entire article 
and conclusions about such a proposal would require a set of normative 
assumptions that would themselves require a detailed defense.  DILs’ 
powerful advantages, however, particularly their capacity to 
simultaneously solve multiple environmental problems and their history 
of having driven beneficial cost-reducing innovations, suggest that 
policy-makers should consider them seriously in the types of situations 
we describe below.  
 
 1.  Relevant Factors  
 
 The foregoing discussion suggests that a number of factors may 
make DILs a desirable option for particular environmental problems.  
First, DILs are most promising when actions reducing inputs can cure 
substantial inefficiencies or where less environmentally harmful 
substitute inputs are available or at least conceivable.188 Moreover, DILs 
will prove particularly attractive for addressing environmental problems 
that involve a production stream with multiple significant pollution 
outputs.   
Because DILs provide no incentive for the installation of end-of-
the-pipe technologies, they may be most attractive in situations in which 
such technologies are not available.  Since they don’t require polluting 
emissions to be measured or monitored, DILs are also likely to be 
attractive in circumstances where pollution outputs cannot be easily 
monitored, as where pollution seeps into the environment from numerous 
diffuse locations.   Because DILs tend to promote fundamental 
technological innovation with all the potential for economic disruption 
that goes along with such change, they may be most appropriate for 
environmental problems that warrant such changes in order to address 
serious harms, especially those that would be irreversible.   
Finally, DILs may be useful when government lacks the 
resources to comprehensively regulate all relevant outputs.  By and large 
the instrument choice debate has focused on the efficient use of private 
resources and has paid much less attention to how governments’ limited 
regulatory capabilities can best be deployed.  For important 
environmental problems of broad scope, efficient use of government 
resources can be critical, especially in less developed countries.  And 
DILs will often use government resources more efficiently than most 
competing instruments.   
To summarize, where one or more of the following factors is 
present, an environmental problem may be one for which DILs present a 
desirable alternative: 
                                                 
 188 See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730.  Cf.  Propellants in 
Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11312-13.    
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1) Feasibility:  Reductions of inputs are feasible. 
 
2) Multiple Outputs:  The production process(es) from which 
the environmental problem stems produce(s) multiple 
environmentally damaging outputs. 
 
3) End-of-Pipe:  End-of-the-pipe technologies are not available. 
 
4) Monitoring:  The polluting outputs cannot be easily 
measured or monitored.  
 
5) Serious or Irreversible Environmental Harm:  The 
problem is serious enough to warrant forcing significant 
innovation, even at the cost of some disruption. 
 
6) Government:  A relevant government does not have the 
resources to adequately address each relevant output and 
harm using an output-based approach 
 
All of these factors do not need to be present in order for DILs to 
present a good option.  Ozone depleting chemicals, for example, did not 
involve a long production stream with multiple environmentally 
damaging outputs.  Nor will DILs necessarily be the best option in all 
circumstances in which one or more of these factors are present.   If 
government can adequately address multiple outputs cheaply through 
comprehensive output regulation and the problem does not demand 
fundamental innovation, then perhaps an output-based approach may 
prove superior.    
 History suggests that policy-makers tend to consider DILs most 
seriously when other approaches simply seem impracticable.  But their 
powerful advantages suggest that policy-makers should consider them 
even when other alternatives are practicable, but the need for innovation 
or the lack of governmental capacity for sufficiently comprehensive 
output controls justifies them.   In any event, the feasibility, multiple 
outputs, end-of-pipe, monitoring, innovation, and government factors 
provide a good starting point for analyzing the desirability of particular 
DILs. 
  
  2.  Fossil Fuel DILs and Other Possibilities 
 
 DILs have the potential to address a number of environmental 
problems more effectively than many competing instruments.  The 
federal government has used them in a limited way to address pesticide 
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use, and might productively use them more expansively, perhaps limiting 
overall pesticide use rather than just individual chemicals.  The entire 
area of non-point source pollution, the most serious remaining water 
pollution problem in the United States, poses challenges for output-based 
regulation and arguably possesses all of the characteristics that invite 
serious consideration of DILs.189   
 While many possibilities exist, we wish to focus here on the use 
of DILs to address fossil fuel use.  This focus will allow us to make the 
entire mechanism more concrete and better explore some of the key 
factors we have mentioned.   This exploration will also set the stage for 
understanding DILs’ broader significance as an aid to reconceptualizing 
environmental law.  While we focus primarily on a DIL limiting oil use, 
most of our observations about this DIL would apply to DILs limiting 
other fossil fuels or a DIL limiting the carbon content of fuels generally. 
 
   a.  Fossil Fuel DILs:  Some Options 
 
  All of the factors that may justify a DIL are present to some 
degree in fossil fuels.  We have already shown that they flow through 
production streams that generate numerous heavily polluting outputs190 
(factor 2) and that end-of-the-pipe controls do not exist for carbon 
dioxide emissions from transportation191 (factor 3).  Fossil fuels are by 
far the most important cause of global warming, accounting for some 
80% of the warming potential from all greenhouse gases combined.192  
And global warming threatens such severe and irreversible harms that 
widespread agreement now exists on the need for substantial innovation 
to address it, especially in the energy sector (factor 5).193  Reductions in 
fossil fuel inputs are feasible, through both improved energy efficiency 
                                                 
 189 See MARK DORFMAN AND NANCY STONER, TESTING THE WATERS:  A 
GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY AT VACATION BEACHES iv (2007), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ttw/titinx.asp; MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
16102.     
190  See supra notes 21 to 23 and accompanying text. 
191  See supra note 61. 
 192 Nordhaus & Danish, PEW REPORT, supra note 51, at 2.  
193  See, e.g., Interview with Lewis Milford, Clean Air Group, Clean 
Energy Group (July 5, 2006) (experts agree that the world needs significant innovation 
in how energy is produced to adequately address climate change); ANDREW E. DESSLER 
& EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 102-106 (2006); Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participation of 
Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the 
Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 365, 388 (2006) (effectively addressing climate 
change requires “large-scale technological and behavioral changes”).  Cf. S. Pacala & 
R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Problem for the Next Fifty 
Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004) (arguing that existing 
technologies can stabilize climate over the next fifty years, but not making this claim 
with respect to the cuts needed after that time). 
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and deployment of alternative energy sources (factor 1).  While some of 
fossil fuels’ pollution outputs can be reliably and inexpensively 
monitored (emissions from large industrial sources), others like motor 
vehicle emissions, are too numerous and disparate for effective 
monitoring to be practicable (factor 4).  This, in turn, raises concerns 
about whether governments have the necessary resources to adequately 
regulate each of the many pollution outputs along each fossil fuel’s 
production stream.  These concerns are even more acute when it comes 
to the over-extended and under-resourced governments of many 
developing nations.  Indeed a number of scholars have already raised 
doubts about the ability of developing country governments to properly 
implement the output-based trading mechanisms called for by the Kyoto 
Protocol.194  Thus, fossil fuel DILs merit serious consideration.     
 For convenience, we focus on the possibility of a DIL limiting 
the production and use of oil.   We could have chosen coal.  One could 
choose to use DILs to limit some fossil fuels and not others.  One could 
also use a suite of DILs to address all fossil fuels.  Alternatively, one 
might focus on carbon as an input.195  Since coal, oil, and gas consist 
mostly of carbon, a limit on carbon would function as a limit on 
gasoline, coal, and oil.196  Designing a DIL that way would add 
flexibility and might merit policy-makers’ consideration.  We focus on 
an oil DIL here in part because this single substance DIL provides a 
simpler illustration of the concept than a very broad DIL.  Moreover, a 
carbon DIL suggests a focus on global warming (even though in practice 
it would provide many non-carbon environmental benefits).  While that 
is certainly an important problem, one of the prime values of a DIL is its 
capacity to spur a broader framing of environmental issues.  Focusing on 
the many adverse environmental effects of a substance like oil provides a 
nice illustration of that potential.       
 Policy-makers designing a DIL for oil would first have to 
confront the question of how stringent the limit on inputs should be.  One 
approach would be to simply limit the projected increase in oil 
consumption.  For example, a government could decide that oil 
consumption would only increase by 1% a year.  If the economy would 
otherwise increase oil consumption by 10% a year, this would spur some 
fundamental technological change and avoid future environmental 
damage, but to a limited extent.  Alternatively, a government could set a 
                                                 
194  See, e.g., Ruth Greenspan Bell, Choosing Environmental Policy 
Instruments in the Real World, in OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: EMISSIONS TRADING 10 (2003). 
 195 See, e.g., Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51; CBO 
Report, supra note 51; Hargrave, supra note 66.  
 196 See FARRELL,  supra note 75, at 9 (compliance with California’s 
carbon intensity target for transportation fuels will require movement to new fuels “that 
do not require petroleum.”).  
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DIL preventing any rise in oil consumption above current levels.197  Or it 
could limit future oil consumption to some fraction of existing 
consumption.198  This last approach would demand real cuts, produce 
substantial environmental improvements, change technologies in a 
profound way, and might seriously disrupt existing industry in favor of 
new industries with competing technologies.  Finally, government could 
phase out oil altogether.199  This approach would probably require a long 
implementation period to manage and ameliorate disruption.200  But it 
would maximize both environmental benefits and disruptions of the oil 
industry.  
 Let’s assume a government decided to implement a 20 percent 
reduction in oil consumption.  It would next have to decide where along 
the production stream to impose the DIL.  One alternative would be to 
impose the DIL downstream, on the gasoline and other oil products 
purchased by consumers.  A gas rationing scheme of this sort, however, 
would pose substantial administrative difficulties.  While we did ration 
gas as part of the effort to win the Second World War, it is not clear that 
environmentally motivated gas rationing could induce the degree of 
citizen cooperation that the war effort produced.201  It does not seem 
practicable to enforce gas rationing without such cooperation.  Even if 
such cooperation were a realistic possibility, such a scheme would 
require an enormous administrative apparatus.202   
A better model would take an approach more like the Montreal 
Protocol and impose the DIL further upstream.  The government could 
limit the production and importing of oil by auctioning off allowances 
equal to 80 percent of the oil consumption in a given year.203   It would 
then require producers to hold allowances for every barrel of oil 
produced and importers to hold allowances for every barrel imported.  
To soften the transition, the government might choose to follow the 
practice of other trading programs and allocate more allowances in the 
                                                 
 197 Cf. 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66729.   
 198 Cf. id..  
 199 Cf. 1993 Phaseout, supra note 88.  
 200 Cf. id. at 65024.  
 201 Cf. Chester Bowles, OPA Volunteers: Big Democracy in Action, 5 
PUB. ADMIN.  REV. 350, 350-59 (Autumn 1945).  
 202 See George H. Watson, State Participation in Gasoline Rationing, 3 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 213, 213-22 (Summer 1943).  
 203 Cf. CBO Report, supra note 51, at ix.  We have provided a simplified 
model that would work adequately in a country that consumed all of the oil it produced.  
If the country, however, exported oil, this model would produce more than a 20% 
reduction of domestic consumption.  If policy makers wanted to only limit domestic 
consumption and not the domestic economies impact on oil use worldwide, it could 
give extra allowances to producers who ship oil overseas to cover the exports.  This 
highlights a problem of leakage, which is not unique to DILs.      
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early years of a program with the number of allowances declining to 80 
percent over time.     
 If the DILs were going to be tradable, the government would 
simply add a rule stating that anybody producing or importing less than 
their DIL, could sell surplus allowances to anybody wishing to exceed 
their DIL.  These allowances could be expressed in terms of barrel of oil.  
Notice that tracking barrels of oil should be much simpler than tracking 
emissions, as we do in emissions trading.    
 This is not a complete description of how the mechanism would 
work, nor is necessarily the best way to design it.  But it suffices to make 
the idea of a DIL concrete in this context. 
  
   b.  An Oil DIL as Climate Change Policy. 
 
 Most scientific descriptions of how society might ameliorate 
global warming recognize the need to abandon fossil fuels over time and 
therefore focus on the variety of technological substitutes available for 
fossil fuels.  Yet, the vast literature on potential legal responses to 
climate change does not generally investigate how governments might 
craft regulation to spur a substitution of new technologies for fossil fuels 
directly.  Rather, it engages in a rather abstract debate about mechanisms 
that would generally encourage carbon “abatement.”204   
 The Kyoto Protocol contains no less than three different types of 
emissions trading programs, all conceived as opportunities for countries 
with expensive abatement options to purchase cheaper reductions 
abroad.205  While scholars have predicted that trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol would encourage innovation, it has in practice, encouraged 
mostly end-of-the-pipe compliance options, such as the application of 
thermal oxiders to control HFC 23, a potent greenhouse gas.206  The 
                                                 
204  See generally BRIAN P. FLANNERY AND CHARLOTTE A.B. GREZO, 
EDS., IPIECA SYMPOSIUM ON CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE (1997); DARWIN C. HALL AND RICHARD B. HOWARTH, EDS., THE LONG-TERM 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: BEYOND A DOUBLING OF GREENHOUSE GAS 
CONCENTRATIONS, VOL. 3 OF ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES (2001); MICHAEL A. TOMAN, ED., CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND 
POLICY: AN RFF ANTHOLOGY (2001); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 
(1991); RUDIGER DORNBUSCH AND JAMES M. POTERBA, EDS., GLOBAL WARMING: 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES (1991). 
205  See Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, 
Designing an International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 160 (2001). 
 206 See Driesen, supra note 143, at ___.   Output-based trading sometimes 
produces innovation and may produce some under the Kyoto Protocol in time.  One of 
us has elsewhere questioned the idea that emissions trading better stimulates innovation 
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reason for this is that end-of-the-pipe controls are less expensive than the 
fundamental technological changes that would prevent most of the 
pollution causing global warming.  The Kyoto Protocol encourages the 
most cost effective options in the short term, taking existing 
technological choices as a given.  It tends, therefore, to disfavor 
expensive investments that would fundamentally change technologies 
over time.   
 Furthermore, the end-of-the-pipe focus has provided no means 
for getting a handle on stopping the fundamental drivers of climate 
change, the proliferation of dirty vehicles and coal-fired power plants 
around the world.  The output focus of Kyoto’s mechanisms is certainly 
not the major culprit in this failure.  The failure to agree on sufficiently 
ambitious and comprehensive emission caps is much more important.  
But this failure has meant that the world has felt free to build new coal-
fired power installations that condemn us to more rapid climate change 
in the future with Kyoto’s emissions trading mechanisms functioning as 
a minor band-aid, an amelioration of very bad fundamental technological 
choices that remain largely unconstrained in most countries.  
Considering DILs forces a confrontation with the need to change these 
choices.   
 In addition, Kyoto’s focus on outputs by necessity leaves out a 
significant percentage of greenhouse gas emissions driving climate 
change, since emissions trading covering the transportation sector is 
infeasible.207  DILs provide a relatively simple and elegant mechanism 
for regulating climate change on an economy-wide basis.   
 DILs may also offer some advantages over the more viable non-
trading methods that have been used to address transport emissions.  
Insofar as countries address vehicle emissions at all under Kyoto, they 
tend toward fragmentary responses.  The most common measures used in 
this sector involve fuel efficiency standards.208  But if people drive more 
as fuel efficiency improves, these changes may not provide absolute 
                                                                                                                       
than performance standards of identical scope and stringency.  See, e.g., Driesen, supra 
note 148; Driesen, supra note 100.  
207  See supra notes 56 to 60 and accompanying text. 
208  The latest set of Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFÉ) 
standards issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 
2006, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006), took what many viewed as far too modest 
steps to tighten fuel efficiency standards for SUVs, mini-vans and pick-up trucks.  A 
lawsuit brought by a coalition of states and environmental groups challenging the rule 
recently resulted in a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals striking it down.  
See Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
No. 06-71891  (9th Cir. 2007).  The new energy bill passed in late 2007 will raise CAFÉ 
standards for cars to 35 miles per gallon by 2020.  See Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, P.L. 110-140, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).      
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reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  So, this response is attractively 
cheap, but unreliable (unless accompanied by DILs).   
 Subsidies can also help encourage movement away from fossil 
fuels.209  Brazil, which may have made more progress than any other 
country in reducing dependence on gasoline, has employed a 
combination of subsidies and regulation of fuel content.210  Where 
governments are sufficiently honest and effective to choose targets for 
subsidies wisely, subsidizing alternatives to fossil fuels can be an 
effective approach.  In other cases, DILs offer the advantage of relying 
on private sector selection of substitutes, when government corruption 
might otherwise lead to poor environmental choices.  Subsidies 
combined with DILs will provide a powerful impetus for change, both 
raising the price of gasoline and lowering the price of the subsidized 
substitutes.                  
 A DIL reducing oil consumption by 20 percent would impose a 
fundamental constraint that would force fuel producers, car 
manufacturers, and consumers to innovate to stay within the constraint.  
As such, it has much greater potential to stimulate the sort of innovation 
needed to address climate change in the long-term than the piecemeal 
approach currently employed to address transport.211 
Moreover, an oil DIL addresses the full array of oil related 
pollution, not only carbon dioxide.  An oil DIL offers a simpler more 
comprehensive approach to this vast array of problems than the 
piecemeal approach we now use.  DILs merit serious consideration by 
policy-makers, both for fossil fuels and for other problems that strain the 
output-based regulatory system. 
 
B.  Changing Our Thinking 
 
DILs have value beyond their potential utility as an instrument in 
our arsenal of environmental tools.  Serious thought about DILs can help 
us productively rethink environmental law.  Below we explore how DILs 
add to our understanding of instrument choice, raise important questions 
about cost-benefit analysis, and finally challenge the way we define 
environmental problems in the first place.      
 DILs help broaden our thinking about instrument choice, as we 
suggested at the outset.  They help us move beyond the sterile debate 
                                                 
 209 See, e.g., Governor Signs Bills on Tax Credits, Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Reduction Goals, 38 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 1744 (August 10, 2007); House 
Passes Bill With Tax Incentives to Promote Renewable Energy, 38 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 
1730 (August 10, 2007). 
 210 See MIKAEL ROMAN, WHAT ORDER IN PROGRESS?  BRAZILIAN 
ENERGY POLICIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Center for Climate Science and Policy Research Report No. 07:02) 49 (2007) . 
 211 Cf., Roman, supra note 169, at 72.  
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about choices between vaguely defined command-and-control regulation 
and equally vaguely defined market-based instruments.  They show that 
choices about whether to regulate inputs or outputs may matter as much 
or more than choices among conventional output-based instruments.   
 
 1.  Instrument Choice:  DILs and Pollution Taxes 
 
 DILs also can help improve our thinking about environmental 
taxes, which in some polities may compete with DILs for policy-makers’ 
allegiance.212  We have seen that economists implicitly distinguish 
between upstream and downstream taxes and recognize the 
administrative cost savings often available from choosing upstream 
taxes.213  Our analysis highlights a feature of many upstream taxes that 
economists have rarely grappled with explicitly, that upstream taxes 
often, although not always, will tax inputs rather than outputs.214   When 
they tax inputs, they will have many of DILs’ advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 To see this, imagine a tax on coal.  Electric utilities could only 
escape this tax by reducing coal usage.  Carbon sequestration would not 
reduce the amount of coal used and therefore would not reduce the tax.  
Like a DIL, then, an input tax will tend to produce more fundamental 
innovation (e.g. switching from coal to other fuels) than will an ouput 
tax, though it will prove less cost effective in meeting a narrowly defined 
objective that might be achieved with a cheaper end-of-the-pipe 
control.215  Also like a DIL a properly designed input tax on coal may 
prove superior in addressing the multiple effects of coal-mining than an 
output tax on power plant CO2 emissions.  Thus, one can expect a tax on 
inputs to offer advantages over output-based taxes similar to those that 
DILs offer over output-based emissions trading.       
 The DIL analysis can inform the design of pollution taxes.  
Economists have dominated this discussion, so that it focuses 
predominantly on static economic efficiency.  For problems sufficiently 
serious to justify major innovation, however, questions of efficacy and 
dynamic efficiency may prove more important.216  To design a tax 
encouraging substitution of cleaner inputs, the main objective of a DIL, 
                                                 
212  Cf.  Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing 
Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe:  Lessons from Economic Literature and 
International Experiences, 43 Ecological Econ. 213, 219  (2002). 
213  See Baranzini, supra note 45, at 406; Muller & Hoerner, supra note 
45, at 42. 
214  Cf. Arild Vatn, Input versus Emission Taxes:  Environmental Taxes in 
a Mass Balance and Transaction Costs Perspective, 74 LAND ECON. 514 (1998). 
 215 Cf. Stavins, supra note 51, at 18.   
216  See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003). 
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one would need impose a tax high enough to make substitutes cost less 
than the dirty input one hopes to reduce.  Even those who prefer making 
static efficiency the major goal of environmental regulation may find this 
approach attractive.  Frequently, the uncertainties involved in 
quantifying the social cost of pollution for purposes of setting optimal 
tax rates are so great, that the economists’ call to establish a tax rate 
equal to social costs offers no practical policy guidance.217  In such 
cases, using an analysis of the relative costs of dirty inputs and clean 
substitutes to inform tax design offers a workable alternative.   
 In the United States, pollution taxes may be politically 
infeasible,218 making DILs, even with their political problems, a 
potentially attractive option.  In other polities, however, the conventional 
literature on choosing between taxes and tradable permits can inform this 
choice.219  This literature suggests that in some circumstances DILs will 
prove more efficient than input taxes, while in other circumstances the 
converse will be true.220  It suggests that allowing the public to directly 
control the amount of reductions made, as in a DIL, is more democratic 
than making the amount of reductions depend on private actors’ 
decisions about how to respond to price increases.221  One might also 
claim that DILs provide greater certainty about how much pollution 
reduction is to be achieved, while taxes on inputs provide less, thus 
suggesting that DILs may prove superior when certainty about the 
environmental results is of paramount interest.222  And conversely, one 
may assert that taxes provide greater certainty about costs, suggesting 
that taxes may prove better if a cost constraint is of paramount 
importance.223  We do not claim that DILs always are better than input 
                                                 
 217 See  Stewart, supra note 125, at 154  Sinden, supra note 44, at 555; 
David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation:  Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 594-600 (1997) . 
 218 See Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 404-05. 
219  See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 58-70 (2nd ed. 1988); William Pizer, Prices vs. Quantities 
Revisited:  The Case of Climate Change (RFF, Discussion Paper 98-02, Oct. 1997); 
Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J. Envtl. 
Econ. & Management 218 (1996); M. L.Weitzman, Prices Versus Quantities, 41 REV. 
ECON. STUDIES 477 (1974). 
220  According to this literature, when there is uncertainty about the costs 
of control, then which instrument produces the more efficient result will depend on the 
relative slopes of the marginal benefits curve and the marginal cost curve.  When the 
benefits curve is relatively flat and the costs curve is relatively steep, then taxes will be 
more efficient.  When the converse is true, trading will be more efficient.  See BAUMOL 
& OATES, supra note 219, at 58-70; Weitzman, supra note 219. 
 221 Cf. Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11311.   
 222 See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30567.  See also 
id. at 30579.   
 223  A critique of these conventional arguments lies beyond the scope of 
the article.  
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taxes, but we do claim that DILs improve our thinking about 
environmental taxation.        
            
 2.  Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 To the extent that governments employ cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA)224 to evaluate DILs, they require a different approach than we 
have used hitherto.  CBA of climate change implicitly evaluates a DIL, 
because economists usually evaluate the costs of climate change 
abatement by estimating, in various ways, the cost of reducing fossil fuel 
use.225  The above analysis, however, suggests that the benefits of a DIL 
addressing fossil fuels will go beyond climate change benefits.  Thus, a 
proper analysis of an oil DIL’s benefits would include consideration of 
the full array of environmental harms associated with oil use, many of 
which we have previously discussed.226   
 Yet, CBA has proven controversial, in part, because we cannot 
quantify and monetize many of the environmental impacts that matter the 
most.227  Demanding that government officials evaluate a DIL’s 
desirability through CBA may prove crippling, even if it should pass the 
test by a wide margin.  CBA of an oil DIL will prove especially difficult 
because of the large variety of environmental benefits associated with 
this DIL.  CBA may inadvertently discourage governments from 
adopting the most valuable DILs, because a large array of benefits makes 
it hard to conduct comprehensive quantitative analysis.   
 DILs also pose challenges on the cost side of the equation.  
Economists usually evaluate costs by reference to the current market 
price of abatement measures.  Because of this, they have a poor record at 
predicting the costs of regulation, because regulation often changes 
markets.  They usually predict higher costs than regulations actually 
                                                 
 224 See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of 
Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413–23 (2005).  
 225 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  
THE STERN REVIEW 258-262 (2006); Terry Barker et al., Avoiding Dangerous Climate 
Change by Inducing Technological Progress;  Scenarios Using a Large-Scale 
Econometric Model, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (Hans Joachim 
Schellnhuber et al. eds. 2006).  
 226 Accord FARRELL ET AL., supra note 75, at 77.  
 227 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 
COLO. L. REV. 335, 339-41 (2006); Sinden, supra note 224, 1423-30; Amy Sinden, The 
Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of 
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 202-207 (2004) 
(discussing nonquantifiability of many benefits associated with critical habitat 
designations to protect endangered species); 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, at 30593, 
30595.   
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produce.228  DILs tend to encourage innovation.  Predicting the 
magnitude of cost savings from innovation is probably impossible, which 
may encourage policy-makers and economists looking for easily 
defensible methodology to fail to take innovation into account.  Failing 
to take innovation into account will lead to exaggerated estimates of a 
DIL’s costs.  This is precisely what has happened with early climate 
change cost-benefit analysis, which produced very high cost estimates by 
assuming that no innovation would occur.229     
 A change in thinking about environmental policy might be 
necessary to properly evaluate DILs.  We doubt that an extremely 
incomplete effort to quantify the dollar value of environmental and 
health benefits coupled with a terribly unreliable estimate of the cost of a 
DIL will provide useful guidance to policy makers.230  Instead, it might 
make sense to address the primary concerns that DILs raise, those related 
to disruption and risk/risk possibilities directly. 
 With respect to disruption, this would include some evaluation of 
who might profit from DILs and who might lose out.231  This could 
include efforts to convince oil companies to invest in substitutes for 
gasoline, something which is beginning to occur, in order to minimize 
disruption of their business.  It might include transition mechanisms for 
workers losing jobs or efforts to support new businesses that might be 
needed to make an effective transition.  If a gasoline DIL is expected to 
raise fuel costs significantly, this may suggest a need to subsidize low 
income drivers and/or invest in mass transit.232  We suggest, however, 
                                                 
 228 See W. Harrington & R.D. Morgenstern, et al., On the Accuracy of 
Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. Policy Analysis & Management 297 (2000); H. 
Hodges, Falling Prices:  Costs of Complying with Environmental Regulations Almost 
Always Less Than Advertised, Economic Policy Institute (1997); U.S. Congress, Office 
of Technology Assessment, Gauging Control Technology and Regulatory Impacts in 
Occupational Safety and Health—An Appraisal of OSHA’s Analytic Approach, U.S. 
Government Printing Office OTA-ENV-635, available at:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity & 
Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 
80 Tex. L. Rev. 1997, 2042-44 (2002) (collecting studies); Ruth Ruttenberg, Not Too 
Costly After All:  An Examination of the Inflated Cost Estimates of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Protections, (Public Citizen White Paper, Feb. 2004), available at: 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF187.pdf. 
 229 Cf. STERN, supra note 222, at 262.   
230  Cf. Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for 
Liberals, 29 Columb. J. Envl. L. 191, 201-28 (2004) (arguing that CBA fails to provide 
meaningful guidance to policymakers). 
231  See Richard D. Morgenstern, Mun Ho, Jhih-Shiyang Shih, & Xuehua 
Zhang, The Near Term Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies on Manufacturing 
Industries (2002). 
232  See Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51, at 15-16 
(suggesting targeted tax breaks or lump-sum payments to low income people to 
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that any evaluation of costs be expressed as a range of values 
incorporating varying assumptions about innovation.233  We should 
recognize that a cost number in a policy evaluation is a prediction about 
the future, not a fact.234    
 This approach suggests a normative point that one of us has made 
elsewhere.  The distribution of costs may be more important than the 
total amount.235  Furthermore, it suggests that cost must be treated not as 
a fact, but as a factor subject to change in response to human decisions 
about investment and policy.             
 We do not mean to stack the deck in favor of any particular DIL.  
If analysis suggested that our oil DIL, for example, would mean that 
people can no longer get to their jobs or drop their children off at school, 
society would have to decide about whether this price is worth paying in 
order to effectively address global warming and oil’s other 
environmental impacts.  But we do think that disruption of people’s lives 
and of their health and environment matter and are worthy of analysis.  
Summations of dollar estimates of costs and benefits do not provide the 
necessary information.   
 Furthermore, policy-makers should consider additional 
qualitative factors. Oil will run out eventually. Society should think 
about whether moving away from it before we commit ourselves to 
significantly more global warming has advantages over waiting until we 
have used the last drop or it has become so expensive that even the most 
expensive substitutes are viable. 
 In short, a DIL focuses our attention on the question of how to 
achieve sustainable development.  Sustainable development is usually 
defined as an approach that meets the basic needs of current generations 
while protecting future generations.236  Advocates of sustainable 
development envision an “integrated” approach to decision-making, 
where the public participates in choosing a path that harmonizes desire 
for economic development with environmental quality.237  The current 
focus on pollution outputs basically accepts development paths chosen 
                                                                                                                       
compensate for increased energy costs); Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions, 
supra note 62, at 6.  
 233 See, e.g., STERN, supra note 225, at 239 .    
 234 See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 75, at 78.  
235  See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
236  World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common 
Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment & Development, at 54, U.N. 
Doc A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987). 
237  See John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development:  The 
Centrality and Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 248, 250 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and 
Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2116 (2005) . 
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with little or no consideration of environmental problems, and then seeks 
to compensate for that path’s negative environmental consequences.  
Evaluating a DIL provides a forum for the sort of integrated 
consideration of meeting peoples’ needs that sustainable development 
envisions. 
 A DIL also advances sustainable development in the sense 
articulated by the economist Herman Daly.  He argues that society 
should hold steady or reduce inputs of non-renewable natural resources 
and outputs of pollution, i.e. throughput.238  He advocates a distinction 
between economic development, which envisions innovation in meeting 
human needs, and economic growth, which relies upon constant and 
ultimately unsustainable increases in throughput.239  A DIL focuses on 
throughput reduction, not just output reduction, and therefore provides a 
mechanism for achieving sustainable development in Daly’s sense.   
 
  3.  Redefining Environmental Problems 
 
 In considering whether any of the DILs described above would 
be desirable, the first question one would ask is whether serious 
environmental problems justify them.  Just thinking about this question 
forces a useful reconceptualization of environmental problems. 
 We tend to think about environmental problems in a very 
fragmentary way.  We think about global climate change, urban smog, 
oil spills, and hazardous air pollutants, for example, as separate 
environmental problems.  Many environmental scholars lament the 
fragmented nature of environmental law and policy.240  Yet, these 
complaints ring hollow, not because they are necessarily wrong, but 
because the authors of these laments often have no viable proposal about 
how to better integrate our effort.  It is not possible to address, or even 
think about, all environmental problems at once, so we must fragment 
our treatment of environmental threats in some way to begin to analyze 
these problems or address them.  Thus, an assertion that we need a 
“comprehensive approach” to environmental problems and lamentations 
about fragmentation do not suffice.  We need  changes in how we think 
about and address environmental problems that are narrow enough to 
facilitate meaningful analysis and action, but not so fragmented that we 
miss too many important connections or act ineffectually.   
                                                 
238  See HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS, 14-50 (1991). 
239  See Herman E. Daly, Sustainable Growth:  An Impossibility Theorem, 
in VALUING THE EARTH 267-71 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Twonsend, eds. 1992). 
 240 See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING 
PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS:  A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY (1995).  
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 Viewing all of the many problems to which fossil fuel contributes 
as separate problems leads to a fragmented response to the problems it 
creates.  For example, we regulate volatile organic compounds from 
petroleum refineries, because they contribute to smog.241  We then 
regulate most of these same compounds again, because many of them are 
also hazardous air pollutants — pollutants associated with cancer and 
other extremely serious health effects.242  We then regulate oil spills 
separately.  And, further downstream, we regulate vehicle emissions 
traceable to gasoline under another series of regulations.243 
 Once we notice how prominent a contributor fossil fuels are to a 
vast array of environmental problems, including, most prominently, 
global warming, we should ask whether we should consider fossil fuel 
use as the problem to solve.  This question invites a radical redefinition 
of environmental policy.  It suggests that we consider the myriad impacts 
of fossil fuel use together along with their myriad benefits.  Once we do 
this, we see instantly that fossil fuel use is absolutely devastating, lying 
at the heart of global warming and most other serious environmental 
problems.  On the other hand, we see that fossil fuel use performs an 
important role in powering our economy.   
 In considering the desirability of a DIL for oil, one would be 
concerned about whether a reduction in oil consumption would disrupt 
transportation.  This question usefully refocuses debate about 
environmental policy.  It’s extremely clear that getting reducing gasoline 
consumption is environmentally desirable.  It’s also clear that gasoline 
has no intrinsic worth.  Rather, it is a means toward the end of mobility.  
The right question to ask is could we have mobility with less oil (or no 
oil).244   
This question leads to consideration of substitutes for gasoline in 
the broader sense we discussed earlier, including the potential for energy 
efficiency improvements, alternative fuels, and perhaps even to the 
potential role of bicycles and mass transit.  In other words it leads to 
evaluation of the feasibility of moving away from gasoline toward 
cleaner approaches.  We think these are difficult questions to answer.  
While some information exists about substitutes and their costs, we have 
already mentioned that DILs tend to change costs by encouraging cost 
                                                 
241  See Environmental Protection Agency, Revisions to the California 
State Implementation Plan, San Joaquin Valley, Unified Air Pollution Control District, 
71 Fed. Reg. 14,652 (Mar. 23, 2006) . 
242  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). 
243  See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(2000). 
 244 This is not the only impact that must be considered.  Oil has some 
non-transportation uses.  See Hargrave, supra note 66, at 9 (noting that some of these 
uses might have no climate change impacts); Tim Hargrave, Sam Keller, & David 
Festa, Accounting for Non-Fuel Uses of Fossil Fuels in an Upstream Carbon Trading 
System (1998).  
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reducing innovation.  Thus, any conversation about substitutes should 
include some discussion of the capabilities of private industry to 
innovate in response to the DIL and of communities to change modes of 
transportation, not just a bureaucrat’s assessment of the current costs and 
benefits of the status quo.  This focus on feasibility in a broad sense and 
the potential for innovation stimulates a useful conversation wholly apart 
from the conclusions one might reach.  It asks the right questions in light 
of what we know about fossil fuel’s environmental effects. 
     
 We have deliberately addressed the DIL proposed here in a fairly 
general way, focusing on the nature of its potential impacts both on 
discourse and on society, rather than purporting to calculate its precise 
effects.  This general approach means that the lessons we have drawn as 
to how DILs productively reshape thinking about environmental law and 
stimulate significant environmentally productive innovation apply to 
other DILs that address fundamental inputs.  DIL’s advantages seem 
powerful enough to merit serious consideration even in cases where 
output regulation is perfectly feasible.  
 
     Conclusion 
 
 DILs have a great track record and significant potential to meet 
our most pressing environmental challenges.  Policy makers should 
seriously consider DILs, especially when confronting problems that 
demand significant technological changes.  Consideration of DILs helps 
us to reconceptualize environmental law in a more holistic and dynamic 
way. 
